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student athletes unlimited education-related benefits and called out the
NCAA’s business model that relies on not paying student athletes under the
justification of amateurism. Alston asserted that the NCAA amateurism
model is not exempt from antitrust law, and a scathing concurrence by
Justice Brett Kavanaugh said in no uncertain terms that “[t]he NCAA is not
above the law.” In the context of the ever-evolving landscape of studentathlete compensation, this Note examines recent changes to the NCAA
compensation model and suggests that antitrust law should be used as a
vehicle to change the game by correcting racial inequities perpetuated by this
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student athletes to seek the full value of their labor.
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“[I]n a time that our nation is going through a racial reckoning, the fact that
African-Americans are disproportionately represented in the sports that
brings in billions of dollars for what acts like a cartel and yet, [the players]
can’t even afford to have meals when they’re hungry, can’t even afford to
have their families see their games . . . [is] unacceptable.”
—Senator Cory Booker (D-N.J.)†

INTRODUCTION
On the eve of the 2021 March Madness tournament, while many college
basketball players were preparing for what could be the biggest game of their
career yet, three basketball players took to social media to remind people that
they are #NotNCAAProperty.1 Geo Baker, a Rutgers basketball player,
† Protecting the Integrity of College Athletics: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, at
1:37:21–:50, 116th Cong. (July 22, 2020), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/protecting-theintegrity-of-college-athletics?fbclid=IwAR2Zv84_ucIhEgmKhrbqyn3ZdFLKyG5MCeCMsjzoC1USY
Nczs8wfT9_X79k [https://perma.cc/KJ58-UADL].
1 See Laurel Wamsley, Before March Madness, College Athletes Declare They Are
#NotNCAAProperty, NPR (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/18/978829815/before-marchmadness-college-athletes-declare-they-are-notncaaproperty [https://perma.cc/3VQJ-H3S2]. Jordan
Bohannon, an Iowa basketball player, and Isaiah Livers, a Michigan basketball player, tweeted messages
reinforcing that they are not NCAA property immediately after Geo Baker, a Rutgers basketball player,
tweeted. See id.; Adam Hensley, #NotNCAAProperty: Iowa Basketball’s Jordan Bohannon, Others Tweet
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tweeted that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA or
Association)—the governing body for college athletics—owns his name,
image, and likeness.2 Baker argued that while students on music scholarships
and academic scholarships can profit by creating albums or offering tutoring
services, student athletes’ inability to profit from their labor results in
unequal treatment.3 Baker’s tweet sought to draw attention to the fact that,
of the nearly $900 million in revenue generated by the NCAA’s annual
basketball tournament, none of it would be used to directly compensate the
student athletes playing in the tournament.4 The #NotNCAAProperty
movement—founded on the viewpoint that “[t]he NCAA too often treats
college athletes like dollar signs rather than people”5—was another plea for
reform during what is arguably the most tumultuous time in the history of
college sports.6
Two crises in 2020 fueled a debate that has been brewing for years—
whether student athletes should be compensated. Specifically, the COVID19 pandemic coincided with the Black Lives Matter movement and drew
unprecedented attention to systemic racism permeating society, highlighting
a system that relies heavily on Black men risking physical harm to support
an entire industry.7 State and city guidelines required people to stay home
Grievances at the NCAA, HAWK CENT. (Mar. 17, 2021, 2:19 PM), https://www.hawkcentral.com/story/
sports/2021/03/17/iowa-basketball-jordan-bohannon-march-madnes-ncaa-tournament-2021-twitternotncaaproperty/4736486001/ [https://perma.cc/CP3Y-W3DX].
2 Geo Baker (@Geo_Baker_1), TWITTER (Mar. 17, 2021, 12:42 PM), https://twitter.com/
Geo_Baker_1/status/1372241981150220290?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ct
wterm%5E1372241981150220290%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fw
ww.npr.org%2F2021%2F03%2F18%2F978829815%2Fbefore-march-madness-college-athletes-declare
-they-are-notncaaproperty [https://perma.cc/6X7Z-T32L].
3 See id.
4 See Wamsley, supra note 1.
5 J. Bradley McCollough, Players Launch #NotNCAAProperty Movement a Day Before March
Madness Begins, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2021, 8:15 PM), https://www.latimes.com/sports/story/2021-0317/players-start-not-ncaa-property-movement-march-madness-tournament
[https://perma.cc/UP9AL4JG]. The #NotNCAAProperty movement began in the summer of 2020 when Baker, Bohannon, and
Livers held a Zoom meeting with other players in the Big Ten college sports conference to discuss safety
challenges the COVID-19 pandemic presented. Id.
6 See Ralph D. Russo, College Football 2021: NCAA Reforms and Pandemic Recovery, AP NEWS
(Jan. 8, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/college-football-alabama-crimson-tide-football-footballcoronavirus-pandemic-college-sports-1cab80be0e12e546e41580259b6cbf92 [https://perma.cc/ED6PXFSK] (characterizing the 2020 season as tumultuous because of schedule interruptions, distractions, and
a lack of fans present due to the COVID-19 pandemic, all amidst discussions of a proposal that would
allow student athletes to be paid for the first time).
7 This Note focuses on men’s basketball and football because they are the only two revenueproducing sports across the NCAA. See, e.g., Michael Rosenberg, It Took a Pandemic to See the Distorted
State of College Sports, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.si.com/college/2020/12/29/
global-pandemic-exposed-ncaa-inc [https://perma.cc/YZ6J-GPYS] (discussing the NCAA’s reliance on
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and avoid nonessential activities, and universities went as far as refusing to
allow college students to live on campus, except in exceptional
circumstances.8 Yet thousands of college football players and basketball
players reported for duty, risking exposure to a disease while experts knew
little about potential long-term health effects.9 Despite being treated as
essential workers, these athletes were not eligible to receive compensation.10
Black student athletes across the country—who make up the majority of
football and basketball rosters11—demanded action to combat racial inequity
and address concerns regarding health and safety and economic justice,12

its two revenue-producing sports that depend heavily on Black players). This Note focuses on Black
student athletes because they make up a disproportionately large percentage of these sports’ rosters. See,
e.g., Christopher Ingraham, NCAA Rules Allow White Students and Coaches to Profit Off Labor of Black
Ones, Study Finds, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/09/07/
ncaa-student-athletes-pay-equity/ [https://perma.cc/G49R-GTNV].
8 See Rachel Treisman, How Is Each State Responding to COVID-19?, NPR (Dec. 4, 2020,
1:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/12/815200313/what-governors-are-doing-to-tackle-spreadingcoronavirus [https://perma.cc/5QUX-PVJV] (providing an overview of restrictions each state
implemented during the development of COVID-19). During fall 2020, many universities either had fully
remote semesters or significantly limited the number of students allowed on campus. For example,
Georgetown University only allowed 2,000 students to return to campus, prioritizing freshmen and
allowing some exceptions, such as resident assistants and students unable to pursue remote coursework.
See Joey Hadden, What the Top 25 Colleges and Universities in the US Have Said About Their Plans to
Reopen in Fall 2020, from Postponing the Semester to Offering More Remote Coursework, INSIDER (July
28, 2020, 2:11 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-major-us-colleges-plan-reopen-for-fall2020-semester-2020-5 [https://perma.cc/6NX9-G92R] (describing approaches many universities took
regarding on-campus housing and instruction to prevent the spread of COVID-19).
9 For example, after an outbreak at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, many students
were sent home while student athletes “were instructed to remain on campus if they wanted to play,
despite the risks.” Editorial Board, College Football Is Not Essential, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/29/opinion/sunday/college-football-covid.html
[https://perma.cc/
SZZ5-7Y9R] (describing how college football players were expected “to do their job” despite many
faculty, administrators, and students planning on a remote semester and pointing out that it was impossible
for players to maintain six feet of distance during games). Furthermore, some athletic programs required
student athletes to sign liability waivers acknowledging the risk of COVID-19 and waiving the right to
pursue litigation in order to participate in team activities. See Ross Dellenger, Coronavirus Liability
Waivers Raise Questions as College Athletes Return to Campus, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 17, 2020),
https://www.si.com/college/2020/06/17/college-athletes-coronavirus-waivers-ohio-state-smu [https://
perma.cc/J5VM-UB2U].
10 Editorial Board, supra note 9; infra Section I.A (describing the NCAA’s amateur model that
prohibits student athletes from receiving compensation).
11 Black student athletes constitute nearly 60% of NCAA football and basketball rosters. See, e.g.,
Ingraham, supra note 7.
12 Amira Rose Davis, Black College Athletes Are Rising Up Against the Exploitative System They
Labor In, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/08/11/blackcollege-athletes-are-rising-up-against-exploitative-system-they-labor/ [https://perma.cc/MD7E-MCAL].
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strengthening discussions in Congress.13 Although this debate has received
renewed attention in the media, courts, and Congress, it is far from novel.
For years, there has been public controversy over whether college
athletes should be paid. This controversy is driven by concerns regarding fair
compensation of labor; unjust restrictions on student athletes’ ability to earn
money; and universities, conferences, and organizations taking advantage of
underprivileged student athletes.14 The NCAA’s model relies heavily on
student athletes not receiving compensation to distinguish them from
professional athletes and market college sports as a distinct product.15
Current and former student athletes who are unhappy with the current
compensation model have pushed for reform, challenging existing
compensation rules and proposing policies that would allow them to receive
additional benefits and compensation for their labor to address the perceived
inequities in the current structure.16
In recent decades, the NCAA has permitted student athletes to receive
more education-related funds. In the mid-twentieth century, for example, the
NCAA began allowing full grants-in-aid to provide for tuition, room and
13 See Sydney Umeri, How Each NIL Bill in Congress Will Affect Student-Athletes, SB NATION (June
23, 2021, 6:09 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2021/6/23/22545287/college-athletesname-image-likeness-bills-ncaa [https://perma.cc/DXY4-QYSB] (explaining that seven congressional
bills addressing student athletes’ name, image, and likeness rights and compensation have been
introduced since 2020).
14 See, e.g., Dave Zirin, A New Study Exposes Just How Racist College Sports Have Become, NATION
(Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/ncaa-revenue-racism/ [https://perma.cc/
LA5W-FXTJ] (characterizing the college-sports model as “hyper-exploitative and immoral” because it
relies on Black players suffering physical pain to produce billions of dollars in revenues used to “support[]
the entire athletic department [and] subsidize athletic endeavors dominated by white, economically
privileged athletes, like sailing, crew, and tennis”); David Simon, End NCAA Cheating and Corruption:
Just Pay Student Athletes, WASH. EXAM’R (Aug. 28, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.
washingtonexaminer.com/end-ncaa-cheating-and-corruption-just-pay-student-athletes [https://perma.cc/
59AM-VHDT] (arguing that elimination of amateurism rules in college sports would put an end to the
corruption present in the NCAA); see also Ellie Simpson & Lauren Chaingpradit, NCAA Says Amateurism
Is ‘Educational’ While Making Millions Off Student-Athletes, GLOB. SPORT MATTERS (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://globalsportmatters.com/youth/2019/04/09/ncaa-says-amateurism-is-key-while-student-athletesare-left-without-food/ [https://perma.cc/ME45-6L46] (explaining that student athletes receiving stipends
“still struggle to make ends meet due to cost of living or their personal situation”).
15 See, e.g., NCAA, 2021-22 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL arts. 12.01, 12.1.2 (2021) [hereinafter
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL] (explaining that “[o]nly an amateur student-athlete is eligible for
intercollegiate athletics participation” and that athletes lose amateur status if they “use[] [their] athletic
skill[s] . . . for pay,” “accept[] a promise of pay,” or accept compensation “from a professional sports
organization based on athletics skill or participation”); see also O’Bannon v. NCAA (O’Bannon II),
802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the NCAA’s grants-in-aid cap violated antitrust laws);
Alston v. NCAA (In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.) (Alston II), 958 F.3d 1239,
1246 (9th Cir. 2020) (reasoning that some aspect of the NCAA’s compensation framework violates
antitrust laws), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Alston (Alston III), 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
16 See infra Section II.A; see also infra Section III.B.2.b (discussing the College Athletes Bill of
Rights sponsored by Senator Cory Booker (D-N.J.), who played varsity football for Stanford University).

1323

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

board, fees, books, and a small monthly stipend.17 In 2015, the NCAA
increased the grants-in-aid cap to account for the full cost-of-attendance
figure.18 Yet the NCAA has hesitated to open the floodgates and allow
outright compensation, generating a great deal of tension between the
Association and players. In several cases addressing student-athlete
compensation, courts have given the NCAA considerable authority to
maintain rules that cap the value of student athletes’ labor, even though such
rules would normally constitute a price-fixing scheme that violates antitrust
law by unreasonably restraining trade.19 Historically the NCAA and courts
have contended that such restrictions are necessary to preserve the market
for college sports and the amateurism of college athletics, but courts have
arrived at this reasoning by considering externalities—such as consumer
demand, when the relevant market was the college education market—that
are not tied to the student-athlete labor market and do not accurately consider
the net effects on this market.20
Against this tense background of controversy over student-athlete
compensation, the Supreme Court recently handed down a landmark
decision stripping the NCAA of the power to cap education-related benefits
that member institutions may offer students who play Division I Football
Bowl Subdivision (FBS) football and Division I basketball.21 NCAA v. Alston

17 See Kristen R. Muenzen, Comment, Weakening Its Own Defense? The NCAA’s Version of
Amateurism, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257, 260 (2003).
18 The increase to the full cost-of-attendance estimate allows student athletes to receive scholarships
for transportation, academic-related supplies, and similar expenses, in addition to the tuition, fees, books,
and room and board that the previous cap included. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Autonomy Schools
Adopt Cost of Attendance Scholarships, NCAA (Jan. 18, 2015), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/
media-center/autonomy-schools-adopt-cost-attendance-scholarships [https://perma.cc/ZJ9H-XH3J].
19 Price-fixing involves agreements among competitors that raise, lower, or otherwise set prices or
competitive terms. Price Fixing, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guideantitrust-laws/dealings-competitors/price-fixing [https://perma.cc/VEB8-NNKG] (explaining that a
“plain agreement among competitors to fix prices is almost always illegal”). Section 1 of the Sherman
Act prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade, which by definition can include a price-fixing scheme. See
15 U.S.C. § 1; see, e.g., O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1079 (challenging the NCAA’s rules, including the
prohibition on student athletes receiving compensation for use of their names, images, and likenesses and
the grant-in-aid cap); Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1245–46 (challenging the NCAA’s compensation framework
in general).
20 In Alston II, Judge Smith acknowledged that despite confining analysis to one relevant market,
courts have not uniformly limited the scope in subsequent steps of the analysis. For example, in one case
the relevant market was defined as the college-education market, yet preserving consumer demand for
college sports was accepted as a legitimate procompetitive benefit. “Jurists faced with weighing the
anticompetitive effects in one market with the procompetitive effects in another cannot simply ‘net them
out’ mathematically.” Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1268–70 (Smith, J., concurring).
21 Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2164, 2166 (2021). NCAA member institutions are divided into three
divisions; Division I is home to “the biggest student bodies, the largest athletic budgets, and the most
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opened the door for some athletic conferences to offer unlimited educationrelated benefits22 and placed a target on the NCAA’s business model. Alston
asserted that the NCAA amateurism model is not exempt from antitrust law,23
and a scathing concurrence by Justice Brett Kavanaugh said in no uncertain
terms that “[t]he NCAA is not above the law.”24 Alston and new state
legislation allowing student athletes to receive money for their names,
images, and likenesses cast doubt on whether amateurism is so indispensable
as to necessitate the deference that courts have given the NCAA.25 In
addition, Alston all but explicitly encourages future litigation against the
NCAA. Justice Kavanaugh pointedly stated that because the student athletes
did not renew their appeal on certain claims from their initial lawsuit, the
Court’s scope of review was limited, but that remaining rules “raise serious
questions under the antitrust laws.”26
This Note, focused on the ever-evolving field of student-athlete
compensation, examines recent changes to the NCAA compensation model
and presents suggestions for moving forward. This Note considers current
proposals for state and federal legislation regarding student-athlete
athletic scholarships.” Justin Berkman, What Are NCAA Divisions? Division 1 vs 2 vs 3, PREPSCHOLAR
(Jan. 20, 2020, 11:27 AM), https://blog.prepscholar.com/what-are-ncaa-divisions-1-vs-2-vs-3 [https://
perma.cc/XR4E-RM8M]. All five major sports conferences—the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big
Ten Conference (Big Ten), Big 12 Conference (Big 12), Pacific 12 Conference (Pac-12), and
Southeastern Conference (SEC), collectively the Power Five—are made up of Division I schools. See id.
The NCAA further divides Division I schools into FBS teams, which compete in postseason bowl games
and the College Football Playoff, and Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) teams. See Patrick
Pinak, College Football Trivia: What Does “FBS” and “FCS” Actually Mean?, FANBUZZ (Aug. 25,
2021, 2:37 PM), https://fanbuzz.com/college-football/what-does-fbs-stand-for/ [https://perma.cc/G5WL658T].
22 There are several independent FBS programs that do not belong to a conference, including
powerhouses such as the University of Notre Dame, the U.S. Military Academy, and Brigham Young
University, which are considered among the top fifty college football programs historically. See, e.g., AP
College Football Rankings: Greatest Programs of All-Time, COLL. FOOTBALL NEWS (Aug. 24, 2020,
2:05 AM), https://collegefootballnews.com/2020/08/ap-college-football-rankings-greatest-programs-ofall-time [https://perma.cc/TAP7-KF58]; Joe Penkala, College Football: Power Ranking the Top 50
Programs of All Time, BLEACHER REPORT (Aug. 16, 2011), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/805789college-football-power-ranking-the-top-50-programs-of-all-time [https://perma.cc/D5NZ-382P]. It is
unclear whether these schools’ primary conferences for other sports would mandate changes to educationrelated benefits allowed for student athletes in their football programs or whether the individual programs
would have the autonomy to enact changes themselves.
23 Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2164, 2166.
24 Id. at 2169 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
25 See, e.g., RAMOGI HUMA, ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY & LUCY MONTGOMERY, NAT’L COLL. PLAYERS
ASS’N, HOW THE NCAA’S EMPIRE ROBS PREDOMINANTLY BLACK ATHLETES OF BILLIONS IN
GENERATIONAL WEALTH 7 (2020), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1z97vhcjErrHIvuO3Nu2wUWbG
90bFKnm_/view [https://perma.cc/SS4G-Q3JB] (explaining that the principle of amateurism the NCAA
relies on stems from British elites’ desire to prevent working-class people from beating them in athletic
competition).
26 Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2166–67 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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compensation and ultimately advocates for allowing student athletes to
unionize and engage in collective bargaining. Part I walks through the
evolution of the NCAA and its compensation model. This Part then describes
the concept of amateurism in sports, the NCAA’s reliance on amateurism as
an integral aspect of its student-athlete compensation model, and concerns
about the racial and socioeconomic inequity the NCAA’s compensation
model perpetuates. Part II discusses Alston in greater detail and explains how
NCAA rules regarding compensation violate antitrust law. Part III goes on
to analyze the impact of Alston on student-athlete-compensation litigation
and on recent state and federal legislation regarding student-athlete
compensation; it then concludes with a proposal for what the ideal federal
legislation should look like and suggestions for moving forward. This Note
argues that antitrust law should be used as a vehicle to correct racial
inequities the NCAA’s business model has perpetuated for decades and
advocates for implementing a collective bargaining agreement to empower
student athletes to seek the full value of their labor.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Historical Development of the NCAA and the
Need for Student-Athlete Compensation
While the NCAA was formed to protect the safety of collegiate athletes
and “improve intercollegiate athletics programs for student-athletes,”27 today
one of its main purposes is to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral
part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the
student body.”28 When the NCAA was formed in 1906,29 collegiate athletes
were not allowed to receive financial benefits from any source, including
“faculty or university financial aid committees,” to maintain their status as
amateur athletes.30 Although the NCAA has not defined “amateur,” amateur
athletes are generally considered to be those who compete in events that “do
not reward victors with a prize of great value.”31 Historically, schools and

27 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 1.2(a). President Theodore Roosevelt called a
meeting to form what would become the NCAA in response to the “increasingly dangerous, and even
fatal, state of college football.” See Muenzen, supra note 17, at 257.
28 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 1.3.1.
29 History, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/history [https://perma.cc/JTD5-3LQQ]. The NCAA was
originally named the Intercollegiate Athletics Association of the United States (IAAUS) and was renamed
the National Collegiate Athletic Association in 1912. See Muenzen, supra note 17, at 257.
30 ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE OF ATHLETES FOR HIRE: THE EVOLUTION
AND LEGACY OF THE NCAA’S AMATEUR MYTH 34 (1998).
31 Sports Law, 9 WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 283 (2d ed. 2008).
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school affiliates—such as boosters,32 alumni, and athletic departments—
circumvented this rule against prizes with illicit payments to maintain a
competitive advantage.33 In response, the NCAA attempted to curtail these
illicit payments by loosening its restrictions to allow student athletes to
receive full athletic scholarships, including tuition, fees, room and board, and
books.34 As recently as 2015, the NCAA increased the limit again to equal
the estimated full cost of attendance, providing student athletes with a
modest living stipend.35
While the restrictions regarding educational benefits were relaxed to
allow student athletes to receive aid up to the cost of attendance, student
athletes over the years have expressed the need for additional aid.36 Many
collegiate athletes, particularly those who participate in football and
basketball, come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and working-class
families.37 Without athletic scholarships, these athletes often would not be
32 Boosters are individuals who contribute financially to a sports team in some way, whether through
direct donations to a university’s athletics department or through financial assistance for players. See infra
note 207.
33 It was commonplace to provide student athletes with money, entertainment and travel expenses,
services, preferential treatment, and benefits for family members. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID
PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 23–25 (2001). As
recently as 2010, a booster for the University of Miami Hurricanes provided “thousands of impermissible
benefits” to the university’s football players and other athletes, including money, yacht trips, jewelry,
televisions, paid trips to nightclubs and high-end restaurants, prostitutes, and an abortion. Charles
Robinson, Renegade Miami Football Booster Spells Out Illicit Benefits to Players, YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug.
16, 2011), https://sports.yahoo.com/cr-renegade_miami_booster_details_illicit_benefits_081611.html
[https://perma.cc/CN6E-68AP].
34 In 1956, the NCAA “voted to allow full grants-in-aid (tuition, fees, room and board, books and
$15 a month ‘laundry money’).” Muenzen, supra note 17, at 260 (quoting ZIMBALIST, supra note 33, at
23–24).
35 In 2015, the NCAA raised the grants-in-aid cap to account for the full cost-of-attendance figure.
See O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2015). Cost-of-attendance figures vary from school
to school and are determined by each institution.
36 A former University of Washington football player explained: “The stipend money is not
enough . . . . It is definitely under the poverty line in Seattle [and] forces [student athletes] to make (a lot)
of decisions.” Simpson & Chaingpradit, supra note 14. A Clemson University football player expressed
his gratitude while acknowledging the inadequacy of the stipend, saying “I know, beggars can’t be
choosers, but it’s still not enough.” Id.
37 A study estimated “that the average football and men’s basketball athlete went to a high school
with a median family income at the 49th percentile of all high schools, while for other sports the average
athlete’s high school was at the 60th percentile.” Craig Garthwaite, Jordan Keener, Matthew J.
Notowidigdo & Nicole F. Ozminkowski, Who Profits from Amateurism? Rent-Sharing in Modern
College Sports 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27734, 2020), https://www.nber.org/
system/files/working_papers/w27734/w27734.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8GJ-RCC5]. The study also found
that “football and men’s basketball players come from school districts with a higher fraction of students
living in poverty and a higher fraction of students who are black.” Id. at 6; Michel Martin & Amanda
Morris, Poor Students More Likely to Play Football, Despite Brain Injury Concerns, NPR (Feb. 3, 2019,

1327

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

able to afford to attend college and obtain a higher education without taking
on a staggering amount of student-loan debt.38 These student athletes would
not have a chance to escape a life of poverty by earning a ticket to the middle
class were it not for athletic scholarships.39
Although the current guidelines allow student athletes to receive
financial aid covering the cost of attendance, many argue that conservative
cost-of-attendance figures do not fully account for the true cost of attending
college as a full-time student.40 This rings especially true for student athletes
from working-class families that cannot provide them with additional money
for nonessential expenses, such as personal expenses—as small as money for
gas or as large as funds for a trip with friends—that their families cannot
afford.41
While many working-class students would be able to earn additional
money beyond any scholarship award through a work-study position or other
part-time employment, student athletes are forced to forgo these
opportunities because of the time commitment required for their sports.42 For
many student athletes, securing an internship, even during the summer, can
be challenging depending on off-season or preseason practice schedules.43
5:38 PM), https://www.kcur.org/2019-02-03/poor-students-more-likely-to-play-football-despite-braininjury-concerns [https://perma.cc/2JUG-2A8L] (explaining that the low barrier to entry for football in
particular and the varied positions that rely on differing capabilities add to its popularity among youth
from low socioeconomic backgrounds).
38 See Simpson & Chaingpradit, supra note 14 (explaining that athletes from families that are below
the poverty line rely on athletic scholarships for the opportunity to attend college).
39 See
Tom Farrey, The Gentrification of College Hoops, UNDEFEATED (2016),
https://theundefeated.com/features/gentrification-of-ncaa-division-1-college-basketball/ [https://perma.
cc/SYA6-K3NX] (explaining that athletic scholarships provide first-generation students degrees and
entry to the middle class, even if they never make it to a professional league).
40 See, e.g., Ann Carrns, The “Indirect” Costs at College Can Involve Nasty Surprises, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/07/your-money/college-costs-tuition.html [https://
perma.cc/LT3V-6UC3] (explaining that students from families with lower and middle incomes who
borrow the maximum amount of financial aid allowable may face trouble paying for unexpected indirect
expenses not included in the cost of attendance).
41 See Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), https://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643
[https://perma.cc/959V-A92T]
(explaining that “impoverished football players cannot afford movie tickets or bus fare home”).
42 See Simpson & Chaingpradit, supra note 14 (explaining that because many student athletes devote
more than forty hours per week to their sports, they do not have the time necessary to hold a job, making
athletic awards their only form of income). A 2019 NCAA study found that FBS football players devote
a median of forty hours weekly to football during the season. NCAA, GOALS STUDY: UNDERSTANDING
THE STUDENT-ATHLETE EXPERIENCE 19 (2019), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/research/goals/
2020AWRES_GOALS2020con.pdf [https://perma.cc/55YZ-HUJ4].
43 Student athletes on football, soccer, track and field, and gymnastics teams, among other sports, are
often expected to spend their summers on campus training. See Marc Tracy, How College Sports Killed
Summer Vacation, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/sports/college-
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Student athletes are left not only with missed income but also with a lack of
opportunities to develop marketable skills.44 A lack of marketable skills
could negatively affect student athletes’ job prospects when they enter the
workforce, thus worsening the disparity between student athletes from lower
socioeconomic backgrounds and their wealthier peers.
Advocates of the NCAA’s current model argue that student athletes
receive the value of a college degree,45 but graduation rates are lowest among
student athletes of color in the sports that produce the most revenue—
football and men’s basketball—meaning these athletes may not even receive
that benefit in full.46 Because student athletes in these programs are more
prone to entering their professional league before graduating, as little as onefourth of a degree hardly seems like just compensation.47
Further, even when scholarship value is taken into consideration,
student athletes still do not receive the market value of their labor. For the
2018–2019 academic year, the average fair market value of FBS football
players was $208,208, totaling $832,832 over all four years of eligibility.48
The fair market value of basketball players at these schools was $370,085
annually, equaling $1,480,340 over four years.49 In contrast, Northwestern
University had the highest cost of attendance of the Power Five schools that
year: $75,348, totaling around $301,392 over four years;50 the benefits
Northwestern student athletes received to cover their cost of attendance paled
in comparison to the fair market value of their labor.

sports-summer.html [https://perma.cc/3TWP-YEK4]. Many student athletes in Division I sports,
including FBS football, would like to do internships but cannot because of athletic commitments. See
NCAA, supra note 42, at 49.
44 See Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1266 (9th Cir. 2020) (Smith, J., concurring), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2141
(2021).
45 See, e.g., Jon Solomon, The History Behind the Debate over Paying NCAA Athletes, ASPEN INST.
(Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/history-behind-debate-paying-ncaa-athletes/
[https://perma.cc/K4E2-4VG8] (“The value of a college degree is viewed very favorably by many
Americans, especially as tuition costs continue to skyrocket that causes students to carry college-loan
debt well into adulthood.”); Megan James, NCAA: Why College Athletes Should Not Be Paid, MEDIUM
(Nov. 3, 2019), https://medium.com/@mjames11/ncaa-why-college-athletes-should-not-be-paiddc92e73bccd8 [https://perma.cc/BZ4E-QTS2] (arguing that “[m]ost of these athletes receive scholarships
that leave[] them paying absolutely nothing to go to a [u]niversity” and that “[i]f you pay college athletes
on top of that, it would be too much”).
46 A study found that Black male athletes are graduating at lower rates when compared with all
athletes and with the overall undergraduate population. Black FBS football players have the lowest
graduation rates across the Power Five conferences. See HUMA ET AL., supra note 25, at 9–12.
47 See infra note 95.
48 HUMA ET AL., supra note 25, at 2.
49 Id. at 3.
50 See Most Expensive Colleges in America by Out of State Total Cost, COLLEGECALC, https://www.
collegecalc.org/lists/america/most-expensive-out-of-state-total/ [https://perma.cc/6NT7-7UEJ].
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Student athletes’ desire to receive greater compensation comes into
conflict with the NCAA’s amateurism model, which relies heavily on not
compensating student athletes to distinguish them from professional
athletes.51 The next Section describes in greater detail the concept of
amateurism the NCAA relies on and how the NCAA’s reliance on
amateurism impacts student athletes.
B. The Principle of Amateurism
Amateurism in sports is a concept referring to any practice of that sport
on an unpaid basis for pleasure, rather than a professional basis for profit.52
The concept of amateurism is central to any discussion of student-athlete
compensation. Because compensation distinguishes amateur sports—
including college sports—from professional sports, student athletes are
considered amateur athletes since they are not paid. The NCAA relies on the
concept of amateurism to defend itself against lawsuits seeking studentathlete compensation.53
Supporters of amateurism contend that amateurism allows student
athletes to better integrate into their college communities and be “students
first.”54 This argument is understandable in light of the fact that the NCAA
was originally created to protect student athletes.55 Proponents of amateurism
argue that if student athletes were treated as professionals, they would be
forced to prioritize their sports over their education, which would be
antithetical to the purpose of college sports.56 However, this concern does not

51 See, e.g., NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.1.2 (listing ways in which student
athletes can lose amateur status by accepting various forms of compensation); O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d
1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The NCAA argued . . . that restrictions on student-athlete compensation are
‘necessary to preserve the amateur tradition and identity of college sports.’”); Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239,
1246 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[C]ollege athletics’ ‘amateur tradition’ helps maintain their popularity as a product
distinct from professional sports.” (quoting O’Bannon v. NCAA (O’Bannon I), 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999
(N.D. Cal. 2014)), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
52 See Amateurism, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2011),
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=amateurism
[https://perma.cc/4KSX-UEZA];
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 2.9 (“Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is
an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial
enterprises.”).
53 See, e.g., O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1058 (“The NCAA argued to the district court that restrictions
on student-athlete compensation are ‘necessary to preserve the amateur tradition and identity of college
sports.’”).
54 See Play Division I Sports, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/play-division-i-sports
[https://perma.cc/R55U-B7XD] (“The young men and women who compete in college sports are students
first, athletes second.”).
55 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
56 See, e.g., James, supra note 45 (“If colleges were to pay student athletes, players would start
prioritizing sports over academics.”).
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reflect the reality of the student-athlete experience in which student athletes
often commit more to their teams than to their studies.57 To meet team
expectations, student athletes are often “coerced to change majors” so that
class meetings do not conflict with practice, placed in “less time-consuming
majors” to ensure they remain eligible to play, and generally forced to
prioritize athletics over education.58 Student athletes are already essentially
athletes first, students second.
Supporters of amateurism further argue that amateurism is integral to
the demand for college sports because “consumers ‘value amateurism.’”59
According to the NCAA, the appeal of college sports stems from nostalgia
for college and the campus experience and the fact that players are students.60
Alumni typically have a vested interest in the brand and represent a
significant portion of a college sport’s fan base61—and college-sports fans
make up the largest fan base in the country.62 Because of alumni interests and
the financial investment alumni often make in college teams, the NCAA
argues that it is imperative that student athletes be perceived as amateur
students playing for their schools, not simply professional athletes wearing
school uniforms.63

57 Jake New, What Off-Season?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 8, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2015/05/08/college-athletes-say-they-devote-too-much-time-sports-year-round [https://perma.cc/
7F3F-ANU4].
58 Brief of Amici Curiae African American Antitrust Lawyers in Support of Respondents at 6, 9, 16,
Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) (Nos. 20-512, 20-520) [hereinafter Brief of Antitrust Lawyers].
59 Alston II, 958 F.3d. 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070
(N.D. Cal. 2019)), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2141.
60 Hayes Rule, A Breakdown of Alston v. NCAA: What Is the Future of Paying College Athletes, and
What Would It Mean for Athletes to Be Paid?, MEDIUM: THE BEARFACED TRUTH (May 4, 2019), https://
medium.com/the-bearfaced-truth/a-breakdown-of-alston-v-ncaa-what-is-the-future-of-paying-collegeathletes-3483569905b4 [https://perma.cc/D5BL-NSRC] (“The NCAA suggested a large draw to the
game is because players are viewed as students along with the love for a college and campus
experience.”).
61 See id. (arguing that “[t]he love for college sports, at its grassroots, is a love for one’s university
competing against others” and that “[p]eople attend these universities and thus have a vested interest in
the brand, different from professional teams, as most people have no close tie to professional teams”).
62 Collectively, college sports outrank professional sports in popularity, with a greater percentage of
fans and “avid fans” than any professional league, and college football and basketball closely trail their
professional counterparts. See Kristi Dosh, New Report Shows How Attractive College Sports Fans Are
to Brand Marketers, FORBES (Aug. 17, 2021, 9:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kristidosh/2021/
08/17/new-report-shows-how-attractive-college-sports-fans-are-to-brand-marketers/?sh=214716ca175c
[https://perma.cc/KLE3-K2J9].
63 In a brief the NCAA filed in Alston I, the NCAA argued that “amateurism is a key part of demand
for college sports,” Defendants’ Closing Brief at 7, Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (No. 4:14-md-02541CW), implying that “if consumers did not believe that student-athletes were amateurs, they would watch
fewer games and revenues would decrease as a result,” Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070.
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However, the NCAA’s concept of amateurism is ill-defined.64 The
NCAA bylaws enumerate events that could cause a student athlete to lose
amateur status and forfeit eligibility to participate in NCAA competitions,
but they do not define amateurism itself. For example, a student athlete can
lose amateur status by accepting a promise of pay (even if the pay will be
received after the completion of collegiate athletics participation), competing
on a professional athletics team (even if no pay is received), or hiring an
agent.65 Over the years, this “line of demarcation” has become more blurred
as the NCAA has adjusted its rules to account for student athletes’ financial
needs, shifting from prohibiting all financial aid and compensation to
permitting certain types of aid and compensation, including tuition, fees,
room and board, and books.66 This blurring of the line has led several student
athletes to push back on the NCAA’s rules by seeking additional
compensation, either through an increased cap on financial aid or through
alternative sources such as endorsement or sponsorship deals.67
Proponents of amateurism are also concerned that if student athletes are
no longer perceived as amateurs, this will signal the NCAA’s transition to
being a minor league.68 College football in particular has been described as
“‘a particular brand of football’ that draws from ‘an academic tradition,’”
differentiating it from and making it “more popular than professional sports
to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as . . . minor league

64 The district court in Alston I noted that the NCAA’s conception of amateurism has changed
steadily over the years and that the NCAA “nowhere define[s] the nature of the amateurism [it] claim[s]
consumers insist upon.” 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1063–64, 1070, 1072–73; see also O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d
1049, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that although the district court rejected the NCAA’s
“longstanding commitment to amateurism” because the definition of amateurism itself is malleable and
has changed significantly, “amateurism serves some procompetitive purposes” and “plays some role in
preserving ‘the popularity of the NCAA’s product’” (quoting O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1005 (N.D.
Cal. 2014))); Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1250 (explaining that although the district court found the NCAA’s
procompetitive amateur theory “largely unpersuasive, the district court ‘credit[ed] the importance to
consumer demand of maintaining a distinction between college sports and professional sports’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1082)).
65 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.1.2.
66 In 2015, the Power Five conferences voted to increase the grant-in-aid limit to the full cost of
attendance, encompassing “tuition and fees, room and board, books and supplies, transportation, and other
expenses related to attendance at the institution.” NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 15.02.2;
see also Rule, supra note 60 (explaining the history of the NCAA’s stance on athletic scholarships and
the Power Five vote in 2015).
67 See O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1079 (challenging the NCAA’s prohibition on student athletes
receiving compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses and the grant-in-aid cap);
Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1245–46 (challenging the NCAA’s compensation framework in general).
68 See O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1078–79 (suggesting that if compensation not related to education
is allowed, student athletes will “continue to challenge the arbitrary limit,” forcing the NCAA to
“surrender[] its amateurism principles entirely and transition[] from its ‘particular brand of football’ to
minor league status” (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101–02, 104 (1984))).
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baseball.”69 This defense of amateurism presents amateurism as a fragile
concept unable to withstand the free market that needs special exemptions
from federal law, instead of as a core principle of a multibillion-dollar
industry.70 This argument also paints an unsupported narrative that demand
for college sports would significantly shrink if consumers no longer felt the
spirit of amateurism.71 College sports and amateur sports are not naturally
synonymous and can exist independently of one another.72
Further, while some trace the origins of amateurism to ancient Greece—
the birthplace of the Olympics—the modern concept of amateurism did not
exist at all in ancient Greece.73 The origins of amateurism actually stem from
the desire of upper-class men to exclude the working class from recreational
sports, relying on the so-called “Corinthian spirit” to keep competition
artificially low.74 British elites, resentful of being beaten in rowing by day
laborers who rowed for a living, modified the concept of amateurism to
embody being a gentleman and not having to work for a living.75 It is this
69

Id. at 1074 (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02).
See Andy Schwarz, The Fallacy of Fragile Demand for “Amateurism,” ATHLETICDIRECTORU,
https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/the-fallacy-of-fragile-demand-for-amateurism/ [https://perma.cc/
EWE5-MAU8] (“At the core of its legal arguments, the NCAA argues (without market-based evidence)
that amateurism is unable to stand on its own in the marketplace . . . and therefore the NCAA is immune
from antitrust scrutiny.”).
71 Id. (highlighting the fact that multiple expert witnesses testified that deferred payments of $5,000
“would not significantly reduce consumer demand for college sports” and no contradictory evidence was
presented (quoting O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1082 n.4)).
72
Id. (explaining that “not all amateur sports are collegiate,” such as youth leagues and recreational
leagues, and some collegiate sports not controlled by the NCAA, e.g., cycling, do not prohibit professional
athletes as long as they are college students).
73 See HUMA ET AL., supra note 25, at 7 (dispelling the notion that modern amateurism originated in
ancient Greece). But see Ross Andrews, Push to Allow Professional Athletes Took Hold in 1968 Olympic
Games, GLOB. SPORT MATTERS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://globalsportmatters.com/mexico/2018/10/15/
professional-athletes-1968-olympic-games/ [https://perma.cc/C6AY-VWXK] (detailing the history of
amateurism in the Olympic Games).
74 See HUMA ET AL., supra note 25, at 7 (describing the origins of amateurism in Victorian England).
“Corinthian spirit” is defined as “an approach to sporting encounter rooted in the amateur philosophy of
football in late 19th-century England when the Corinthian (Casuals) club was formed [in response] to the
emergence and rise of . . . professionalism in the sport.” Overview: Corinthian Spirit, OXFORD
REFERENCE, https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095639366 [https://
perma.cc/CB8B-XFYE] (quoting ALAN TOMLINSON, A DICTIONARY OF SPORTS STUDIES (2010)).
75 Olympic historian Bill Mallon explained that
70

[a]mateurism really started when the people who were rowing boats on the Thames for a living
started to beat all the rich British aristocrats. That wasn’t right. So they started a concept of
amateurism that didn’t exist in ancient Greece, extending it more and more to the notion of being
a gentleman, someone who didn’t work for a living and only did sport as a hobby.
See HUMA ET AL., supra note 25, at 7 (quoting Patrick Hruby, The Olympics Show Why College Sports
Should Give Up on Amateurism, ATLANTIC (July 25, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/
archive/2012/07/the-olympics-show-why-college-sports-should-give-up-on-amateurism/260275/ [https:
//perma.cc/V58X-SDJG]).
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version of amateurism that the Ivy League institutions sought to replicate,
and after others witnessed the success of the first intercollegiate sporting
event—a rowing match between Harvard and Yale76—this version became
the model in U.S. higher education.77
Other East Coast universities began recruiting lower- and middle-class
young men from the South and Midwest to attract top talent; this led to an
identity crisis among prestigious universities, who considered their
educational mission inseparable from their students’ class and race.78 The
solution they consequently devised was to incorporate intercollegiate
athletics into their universities’ missions, which allowed universities to
prevent the recruitment of lower- and middle-class athletes. By using
amateurism as a proxy for “a white and wealthy New England social status,”
elite East Coast schools were able to maintain their “mythical prestige.”79
Amateurism also became a tool to dismiss complaints of racism during
the mid-twentieth century, when the racial integration of college sports
accelerated.80 When Black players arrived at predominantly white
institutions seeking an opportunity for social and economic mobility, they
still encountered discrimination and minimal academic support. College
sports were framed as a justification for this unequal educational experience
because they offered a “unique educational opportunity for lower-class
Black men who otherwise would not attend the university.”81 The tension
between the idea of amateurism and the “racialized economic reality of
college sports” has continually plagued the NCAA model throughout its
history.82 In 2022, a system modeled after the British scheme to “preserv[e]
sport for a White aristocracy that had access to money and power, and

76 See tfife, Rejecting the Myth of Amateurism Beyond NCAA v. Alston, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
(Apr. 7, 2021), https://harvardcrcl.org/rejecting-the-myth-of-amateurism-beyond-ncaa-v-alston/ [https://
perma.cc/3Q4J-PJ4Z].
77 See Hruby, supra note 75 (explaining that Harvard, Yale, and other American schools emulated
the English concept of amateurism). Princeton and Harvard were among the first to establish football
teams in the history of college football. See Adam Marshall, The Oldest American College Football
Teams, ATL. RIDE, https://www.atlanticride.com/the-oldest-american-college-football-teams-top-10/
[https://perma.cc/96AC-BEFU].
78 See tfife, supra note 76.
79 Id. Alexander Meiklejohn, Dean of Brown University at the turn of the twentieth century,
attributed the increasing number of football deaths to men who were “brutal and tricky in character” being
hired to play. Id. According to Walter Camp, the founder of modern-day football, “[a] Gentleman never
compete[d] for money.” Id.
80 See id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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designed as a means of excluding members of racial and ethnic minorities,”
contradicts the NCAA’s stated goal of promoting racial justice.83
The growth of professional sports and the popularity of corporate
sponsorships and endorsements throughout the last century muddled the
distinction between amateur and professional athletes in most team sports.84
Even the Olympics, which were originally only for amateur athletes,
adapted.85 Toward the end of the twentieth century, the Olympic amateurism
rules were relaxed to allow Olympic athletes to accept endorsements and
prizes and even to allow professional athletes to compete in almost all sports
in the Olympic Games.86 If the Olympics have not suffered in popularity
since largely abandoning their amateur requirement,87 it is unlikely that
abandoning amateurism would be the demise of college sports. As an
antitrust economist with sports experience noted, “People’s love of
competition trumps anybody’s love of athlete poverty.”88 The NCAA’s
reliance on amateurism presents a weak argument that is further weakened
by equity concerns that the refusal to pay student athletes implicates.
C. Equity Concerns
In addition to challenging the weakly supported concept of amateurism,
NCAA critics argue that the amateurism model in college athletics implicates
several equity concerns because student athletes are not able to share in the
profits from the billion-dollar industry that universities, athletic programs,
and coaches do share.89 Student athletes’ labor generates billions of dollars
through multiple avenues, such as ticket sales, television contracts, and

83 HUMA ET AL., supra note 25, at 7. In 2020, the NCAA published a number of strategies to address
racial injustice and advance racial equity. NCAA OFF. OF INCLUSION, STRATEGIES: ADDRESSING RACIAL
INJUSTICE (2020), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/inclusion/ethnic/INC_AddressingRacialInjustice.
pdf [https://perma.cc/TW4L-G8TB].
84 Can Professional Athletes Compete in Olympic Sports?, RULES OF SPORT, https://www.
rulesofsport.com/faq/can-professional-athletes-compete-in-the-olympics.html [https://perma.cc/YY4T9834].
85 Id.
86 Hruby, supra note 75; Andrews, supra note 73.
87 Since loosening their amateur requirements, the Olympic Games have become “more fanfriendly,” driving ratings and revenue up: “[T]he mostly amateur 1980 [Games] earned $30 million in
sponsorship revenue; by contrast, the wholly professional 2002 [Games] cleared $840 million.” Hruby,
supra note 75.
88 See id. (quoting Andy Schwarz’s argument that the market demand for the Olympic Games did
not depend on whether athletes received compensation).
89 See Rule, supra note 60.
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merchandise.90 Coaches at flagship public universities are often the highest
paid state employees.91 NCAA executives, commissioners of the Power Five
conferences, and many Power Five athletic directors enjoy million-dollar
salaries.92 Yet the talent that earns this industry’s million-dollar payouts
receives no compensation.
One equity concern the amateurism model implicates is that student
athletes’ careers playing FBS football and Division I basketball often have a
short lifespan. The NCAA is the primary route to becoming a professional
athlete, and aspiring athletes often have no comparable alternatives
immediately after high school.93 Fewer than 2% of student athletes will ever
play at a professional level.94 Athletics’ physical nature limits the length of
playing careers; since aspiring professional athletes in football and
basketball are required to spend at least one year out of high school before
they are eligible to play professionally, most spend at least some of their
prime years playing in college at the amateur level.95 At the collegiate level,
while student athletes have not yet reached the professional level, it is
understandable that student athletes want some compensation for playing
See Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1266 (9th Cir. 2020) (Smith, J., concurring), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2141
(2021). The Department of Education reported that in 2018 college sports generated $14 billion in
revenue. CHRIS MURPHY, MADNESS, INC., HOW EVERYONE IS GETTING RICH OFF COLLEGE SPORTS EXCEPT THE PLAYERS 3 (2019), https://www.murphy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/NCAA%20Report_
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y5K-K38H].
91 Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1266 (Smith, J., concurring). In 2020, the head football or basketball coach
at a state college was the highest paid public employee in forty states. Zirin, supra note 14. The average
salaries of Power Five head football coaches range from $3,153,713 to $4,978,859.50. HUMA ET AL.,
supra note 25, at 3–4.
92 For the 2017–2018 academic year, the NCAA president received nearly $4 million in
compensation, and commissioners of Power Five conferences received compensation packages ranging
from around $2 million to $5.5 million. HUMA ET AL., supra note 25, at 4. In 2020, the average
compensation of athletic directors of Power Five programs was $1,071,831. Id.
93 Although the NBA’s G League program allows elite high school players to play professionally for
a year and then enter the draft, “there are no professional [or college] football or basketball leagues
capable of supplying a substitute for the bundle of goods and services that FBS football and Division I
basketball schools provide.” O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting O’Bannon I, 7 F.
Supp. 3d 955, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
94 See Angela Farmer, Let’s Get Real with College Athletes About Their Chances of Going Pro,
CONVERSATION (Apr. 24, 2019, 6:47 AM), https://theconversation.com/lets-get-real-with-collegeathletes-about-their-chances-of-going-pro-110837 [https://perma.cc/HPY9-YUDW] (stating that fewer
than 2% of student athletes “play professional sports at any level for any amount of time”).
95 To be eligible for the NFL draft, athletes must have been out of high school for three years. The
Rules of the Draft, NFL FOOTBALL OPERATIONS, https://operations.nfl.com/journey-to-the-nfl/the-nfldraft/the-rules-of-the-draft/ [https://perma.cc/N68T-K9EQ]. To enter the NBA draft, an individual must
be at least nineteen years old during the calendar year of the draft and at least one NBA season must have
lapsed since their high school graduation. Michael McCann, Examining What a Change to the NBA’s
One-and-Done Rule Could Mean for All Involved, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.si.
com/nba/2019/03/03/legal-analysis-change-age-eligibility-rule-one-and-done [https://perma.cc/VNE6LXBF].
90
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during their prime years, especially considering the prevalence of
concussions and other injuries that limit their tenure in their sports.96
A second, oft-cited equity criticism of college sports is that the NCAA’s
model relies on Black men to generate revenue that is transferred to white
coaches and administrators and reinvested in communities that are
predominantly white.97 Although schools in the Power Five conferences have
an average of twenty different sports, 58% of athletic department revenue
comes from football and men’s basketball.98 Fifty-six percent of NCAA
Division I men’s basketball players and 49% of Division I football players
are Black, while Black men represent only 15% of head football coaches and
28% of head basketball coaches.99 In contrast, 82% of Division I head
football coaches were white in 2020,100 and 78% of Division I basketball
seasons from 2008 to 2020 were coached by a white head coach.101
Preventing student athletes from profiting from their own labor has
transferred approximately $10 billion in generational wealth from mostly
Black football and men’s basketball players to mostly white coaches and
administrators.102 Less than 7% of revenue from football and basketball goes
to athletes in the form of scholarships, while much of the money is reinvested
96 Concerns about football players suffering multiple concussions and their long-term effects have
been well documented. Over three football seasons, 500 concussions were reported, and a report by the
Centers for Disease Control found that football accounts for the “largest proportions of injuries requiring
[at least] seven days before return to full participation, or requiring surgery or emergency transport.”
Katherine Wiles, College Football, by the Numbers, MARKETPLACE (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.
marketplace.org/2019/08/29/college-football-by-the-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/AM99-6G96]; Zachary
Y. Kerr, Stephen W. Marshall, Thomas P. Dompier, Jill Corlette, David A. Klossner & Julie Gilchrist,
College Sports-Related Injuries—United States, 2009–10 Through 2013–14 Academic Years,
64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1330, 1332 (2015).
97 See, e.g., Zirin, supra note 14 (explaining that for years critics of the college sports model have
pointed out that football and men’s basketball—the two sports that generate revenue used to support
athletic departments—rely on Black players who produce billions of dollars in wealth but are unable to
receive any income). A Nielsen study also revealed that of the 159 million Americans who watched at
least one minute of the 2016 season of college football, less than 24% were Black or Hispanic viewers,
moving the revenue generated by Black student athletes further into white communities through television
advertisement. HUMA ET AL., supra note 25, at 3 n.5.
98 Sachin Waikar, Big-Time College Athletes Don’t Get Paid. Here’s How This Amplifies Racial
Inequities., KELLOGGINSIGHT (Feb. 4, 2021), https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/collegeathletes-dont-get-paid-racial-inequities [https://perma.cc/TG5N-JM6Q].
99 HUMA ET AL., supra note 25, at 6.
100 See Ryan McFadden, There Are Few Black Coaches in College Football and the NFL.
Maryland’s Mike Locksley Has Formed a Coalition to Change That, BALT. SUN (Aug. 17, 2021, 4:34
PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/sports/terps/bs-sp-mike-locksley-20210817-37fyejrsozdwtfofgz6t6
r62ve-story.html [https://perma.cc/X8DZ-T9J7].
101 See Stephen Austin, The Inequality of Coaching College Basketball, ATHLETICDIRECTORU,
https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/the-inequality-of-coaching-college-basketball/ [https://perma.cc/
589Q-MD8S].
102 HUMA ET AL., supra note 25, at 3.
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back into athletic programs to cover facilities expenses and pay coaches,
whose salaries have doubled over the last fifteen years.103 These revenueproducing sports also subsidize non-revenue-producing sports such as
baseball, golf, and soccer, which are played by athletes who tend to be white
and come from higher income neighborhoods.104
Critics of the NCAA’s model and the racial and socioeconomic equity
concerns of the amateurism approach have used multiple avenues to push for
change, including pursuing litigation and lobbying for legislation at the state
and federal levels. While some of these bills are more optimal than others,
as will be discussed in Part III, the common result is that they represent the
mounting pressure that has prompted the NCAA to change some of its rules.
In particular, efforts to challenge the NCAA’s noncompensation model
recently resulted in a landmark decision by the Supreme Court and an evenmore-impactful concurrence by Justice Kavanaugh that practically invites
future litigation against the NCAA.105
II. STUDENT-ATHLETE-COMPENSATION LITIGATION
The NCAA’s reluctance to modify its rules has led courts to step in and
modify the NCAA’s rules for it, finding that some restraints were so strict
that they constituted violations of antitrust law.106 This Part provides a
background of the relevant antitrust law fundamental to understanding
challenges brought against the NCAA, then analyzes the trial and appellate
Alston decisions, including the Supreme Court opinion issued in June 2021.
A. Antitrust Law in the Context of College Sports
Since 1984, when the Supreme Court announced in NCAA v. Board of
Regents that the NCAA is not exempt from scrutiny under the Sherman
Antitrust Act,107 several collegiate athletes have challenged the NCAA for

103

See Garthwaite et al., supra note 37, at 1; Waikar, supra note 98; Zirin, supra note 14.
See Simpson & Chaingpradit, supra note 14; Waikar, supra note 98.
105 Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2164, 2166 (2021); id. at 2166–67 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
106 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984) (holding that the NCAA’s television
plan violated the Sherman Antitrust Act and was an unreasonable restraint of trade); Alston II, 958 F.3d
1239, 1243–44 (9th Cir. 2020) (reasoning that NCAA rules setting a maximum limit on education-related
benefits violated antitrust law), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2141; O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015)
(concluding that some NCAA compensation rules constituted antitrust violations). A principal objective
of antitrust law is to “protect the process of competition for the benefit of consumers, making sure there
are strong incentives for businesses to operate efficiently, keep prices down, and keep quality up.” The
Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/
antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/7BM3-69MX].
107 See 468 U.S. at 88.
104
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violations of antitrust law.108 Section 1 of the Sherman Act technically
prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade.”109 But since every contract between parties
restricts trade on some level, courts interpret this prohibition to only apply
to “unreasonable restraints.”110
Horizontal price-fixing agreements are per se antitrust rule violations
that would automatically be deemed illegal.111 However, the sports industry
is given more leeway because some level of cooperation is necessary.112 For
sports competition to exist at all, some coordination is required, such as
agreeing to rules of the game and how and where the competitions will be
held.113 Horizontal restraints occur when, for example, NCAA member
institutions agree across the board to abide by certain restraints, such as
setting a maximum amount of scholarships and benefits that may be awarded
to student athletes; these restraints are common in industries in which “some
activities can only be carried out jointly,” such as league sports.114 Because
many of these mutually agreed-upon restrictions that are necessary to
preserve the NCAA’s tradition of amateurism would be illegal per se, the
Court in Board of Regents determined that a per se rule is inappropriate for
the NCAA.115 Instead, the Court announced that the more permissive “rule
of reason” analysis is appropriate for “an industry in which horizontal

108

See, e.g., Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1243–44 (determining that rules restricting education-related
benefits violated the Sherman Act); O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1079 (reasoning that restraining member
institutions from providing student athletes with full cost-of-attendance scholarships was an unreasonable
restraint on trade).
109 15 U.S.C. § 1.
110 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98.
111 A “horizontal” restraint is an agreement between competitors at the same level of market
structure, as opposed to a “vertical” restraint, which involves agreement between entities at different
levels of market structure. See 58 C.J.S. Monopolies § 72, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2022). An
inherently anticompetitive practice that “facially appears” to “always or almost always tend to restrict
competition” is deemed a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979). Horizontal price-fixing restraints always tend to
restrict competition because of the high probability that these restraints are anticompetitive. See id. at 23.
112 See Oliver Budzinski & Stefan Szymanski, Are Restrictions of Competition by Sports
Associations Horizontal or Vertical in Nature?, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 409, 411 (2015).
113 See id.
114 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101. In collegiate sports, for example, horizontal restraints are
necessary because institutions that set lower scholarship caps or award fewer benefits than other
institutions will automatically be at a disadvantage in recruiting athletes. See Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d
426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that not abiding by restrictions prohibiting “improper inducements”
would lead to a “decided competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining highly prized student
athletes”).
115 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100–01.
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restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at
all.”116
The rule of reason is a burden-shifting framework that balances
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of restraints on trade. In context,
the rule of reason allows the NCAA to promulgate rules necessary to strike
the appropriate balance between procompetitive and anticompetitive effects
on the market for amateur athletic competition.117 Critics who have
challenged the NCAA in court have sought to show that the anticompetitive
effects of NCAA regulations outweigh the procompetitive benefits and that
a less restrictive alternative could achieve the same benefits.118 Courts have
observed that the rule of reason requires a three-pronged analysis, although
the rule is applied in varying formulations.119 Generally, the party
challenging an NCAA regulation under the rule of reason must show that the
challenged rule produces significant anticompetitive effects in the relevant
market; the burden then shifts to the defendant, who must show that the
challenged rule promotes procompetitive effects; the third step requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate sufficient evidence that legitimate procompetitive
goals could be achieved by less restrictive alternatives.120 If the
procompetitive effects of a relatively restrictive rule are particularly strong—
such as enhancing public interest in intercollegiate athletics—then even if
the rule produces significant anticompetitive effects, it will still be allowed
if the goals could not be achieved by a significantly less restrictive
alternative. The Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon v. NCAA later clarified that “to
be viable under the Rule of Reason[,] an alternative must be ‘virtually as
effective’ in serving the procompetitive purposes of the NCAA’s current

116 Id. at 101. “[T]he NCAA and its member institutions market . . . competition itself—contests
between competing institutions.” Id.
117 See Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (explaining that courts “must balance
the harms and benefits of the challenged conduct to determine whether it is reasonable” (internal quotation
marks omitted)), aff’d, 958 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
118 See id. at 1096–98.
119 The rule of reason is often defined as a burden-shifting test under which the burden is originally
on the plaintiff, then shifts to the defendant for the second prong, then back to the plaintiff for the third
prong; some formulations include balancing the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects after the third
prong, contemporaneously with the second prong, or only when the third prong is not met. See id. at
1107–08. Some formulations do not mention a burden-shifting test at all. See id. at 1108. The O’Bannon
and Alston courts applied the three-step burden-shifting test without necessarily proceeding to the
balancing step, so this Note applies that formulation as well.
120 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98, 114, 119; Michael A. Carrier, The Four-Step Rule of Reason,
ANTITRUST, Spring 2019, at 50, 50, https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/
ANTITRUST-4-step-RoR.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8N4-AF32]. The majority of agreements analyzed
under antitrust law are considered under the rule of reason analysis.
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rules, and ‘without significantly increased cost.’”121 Ultimately, by applying
the rule of reason analysis, the Board of Regents Court granted ample latitude
to the NCAA to administer college athletics. The Court reasoned that “[t]he
NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of
amateurism in college sports,” and “the preservation of the student-athlete in
higher education adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics.”122
Nevertheless, current and former student athletes have continued
challenging the NCAA for violations of the Sherman Act. Following Board
of Regents, the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits repeatedly rejected
claims of antitrust violations challenging NCAA compensation rules.123
Then, in 2015, a circuit split emerged as a former UCLA basketball player,
joined by thousands of other former Division I football and men’s basketball
players, alleged that the NCAA violated antitrust law by preventing former
athletes from receiving compensation related to their names, images, and
likenesses (NIL) in broadcasts and video games and challenged the grant-inaid cap.124 In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit did not overturn the NCAA’s rules
prohibiting players from receiving compensation for their NIL, but it did
hold that the NCAA’s grant-in-aid cap violated antitrust law125 and affirmed
the district court’s decision to raise the grant-in-aid cap to the full cost of
attendance.126 O’Bannon was “the first [decision] by any federal court to hold
that any aspect of the NCAA’s amateurism rules violate[s] the antitrust
laws.”127
The resulting increase in aid to the full cost-of-attendance amount was
a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, current and former student athletes
have continued challenging the NCAA for violations of the Sherman Act,
including in a landmark Supreme Court case decided in 2021.

121 802 F.3d 1049, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp.,
236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001)).
122 468 U.S. at 120.
123 These circuits have rejected antitrust challenges to NCAA amateurism rules, often at the motion
to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2018) (stating that “an NCAA
bylaw is presumptively procompetitive when it is clearly meant to help maintain the revered tradition of
amateurism in college sports or the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (dismissing a complaint
challenging an NCAA eligibility rule that “allow[ed] for the survival of the product [and] amateur
sports”), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343–
45 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding NCAA eligibility rules at the motion to dismiss stage).
124 See O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1055–56.
125 Prior to O’Bannon, the grant-in-aid cap covered “the total cost of tuition and fees, room and board,
and required course-related books.” Id. at 1054 (internal quotation marks omitted). It was then increased
to account for full cost-of-attendance estimates. Id. at 1054–55.
126 Id. at 1053.
127 Id.
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B. The Alston Decision
In 2014, Shawne Alston, a former football player at West Virginia
University representing a class of former student athletes, filed a class action
lawsuit against the NCAA and the Power Five conferences individually.128
The plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA and Power Five conferences committed
an antitrust violation by setting an artificially low cap on the value of athletic
scholarships that was below the value a competitive market would yield.129
In 2021, the Supreme Court affirmed a Ninth Circuit ruling enjoining the
NCAA from restricting education-related benefits that member institutions
may offer students who play FBS football and Division I basketball.130 The
district court that originally heard Alston concluded that limits on educationrelated benefits essentially constituted a horizontal price-fixing scheme and
were unreasonable restraints on trade, and therefore a violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act.131
In Alston, the district court applied the three-prong rule of reason
analysis. The court first accepted that the relevant market was student
athletes selling their “labor in the form of athletic services” to schools in
exchange for scholarships and payments allowed by the NCAA.132 The court
then reasoned that the student athletes had satisfied the first prong of the rule
of reason analysis by successfully showing that the restraints put in place by
the NCAA produced significant anticompetitive effects in the relevant
market for student athletes’ labor.133 Because the NCAA capped
compensation available to athletes at an artificially low level across all
member institutions, student athletes could not test the market by seeking out
128

See Justin Sievert, The Forgotten Antitrust Case: How an NCAA Loss in Alston Could Impact
College Athletics, SPORTING NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.sportingnews.com/us/ncaa-football/
news/ncaa-antitrust-case-shawne-alston-effects-college-athletics/1uro6chmw5naj1o6n15opblfmy [https:
//perma.cc/9YWG-4LJN].
129 See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2152 (2021). Although the NCAA increased the grant-in-aid cap
to the full cost of attendance following O’Bannon II, the plaintiffs argued that this new maximum was
still below the market value of student athletes’ labor. See Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d, 1058, 1097–98 (N.D.
Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2141.
130 Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2166. The California district court had enjoined the NCAA from enforcing
rules restricting education-related benefits, such as scholarships for graduate school, that member
institutions may offer students who play FBS football and Division I basketball, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding. Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1243–44.
131 Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1248; see also Robert B. Barnett Jr., NCAA Found to Be Guilty of a Sherman
Act Price-Fixing Scheme but the Remedy Leaves the Rules Mostly in Place, WOLTERS KLUWER (Mar.
11, 2019) https://www.vitallaw.com/dashboard/antitrust-competition [https://perma.cc/EBF8-RZHX]
(explaining that the district court held that NCAA unreasonably restricted trade by engaging in a
horizontal price-fixing scheme, thereby violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act (citing Alston I, 375 F.
Supp. 3d at 1058, 1109)).
132 Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1248 (citing Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1067, 1097).
133 Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1097–98 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984)).
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schools that would offer greater compensation and, therefore, could not
determine the fair market value of their skills or where their skills would
receive the most benefits.134
The second rule of reason prong required the NCAA to present evidence
of the procompetitive effects of the restraints on education-related benefits.
The court agreed that many of the restraints, including limits on above-costof-attendance payments unrelated to education, the cost-of-attendance cap
on athletic scholarships, and restrictions on academic and graduation awards
and incentives, served the procompetitive purpose of maintaining a
distinction between collegiate and professional sports.135 Nonetheless, the
district court, relying on NCAA testimony, demand analysis, and survey
evidence, concluded that the remaining rules restricting noncash educationrelated benefits—such as limits on postgraduate scholarships, academic
tutoring payments, and post-eligibility internships—did not foster consumer
demand.136
The court also reasoned that the student athletes satisfied the third rule
of reason prong by identifying substantially less restrictive means that could
be used to achieve legitimate procompetitive goals.137 Specifically, the
district court identified the alternative of (1) prohibiting the NCAA from
setting a cap on noncash education-related benefits and (2) limiting academic
and graduation awards and incentives to below the maximum amount of total
compensation that a student athlete may receive as less restrictive means than
limiting all education-related benefits.138 As part of that alternative, the court
permitted individual conferences to set limits on education-related
benefits,139 reasoning that education-related benefits “cover legitimate
education-related costs” and are “easily distinguishable from professional
salaries.”140
While the district court ultimately ruled against the NCAA, the district
court’s analysis is premised on flawed reasoning, as Circuit Judge Milan
Dale Smith Jr. identified in his concurring opinion to the Ninth Circuit’s
decision on appeal. While the first step of the rule of reason analysis is
134 See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1248 (explaining that, “but for the challenged restraints, schools would
offer recruits compensation that more closely correlates with their talent”).
135 Id. at 1250–51 (citing Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1082–83).
136 See id. at 1249–51, 1257–58 (explaining that after considering evidence from both parties, the
district court found the NCAA’s procompetitive theory unpersuasive and found that limits on noncash
education-related benefits do not have a procompetitive effect (citing Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070–
80)).
137 Id. at 1251–52 (citing Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1087–88, 1105).
138 Id. at 1260 (citing Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1087).
139 Id. at 1251.
140 Id. at 1260–61 (quoting Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1105).
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confined to the definition of the market in which the challenged restriction
occurs, the second prong often goes beyond this market when considering
procompetitive effects.141 Although some courts have rejected
procompetitive effects outside of the defined market,142 the courts in both
O’Bannon and Alston included procompetitive benefits not tied to the
relevant market in their analyses.143 Despite defining the relevant market as
student athletes “sell[ing] their ‘labor in the form of athletic services’ to
schools in exchange for” permissible scholarships and payments,144 the
courts accepted third-party benefits, such as preserving the amateur nature
of collegiate sports to increase demand for consumers.145 Consumer demand
has no effect on the market for student athletes selling their labor since the
current model does not allow student athletes to receive any revenue
increased consumer demand may drive. If the rule of reason is meant to
determine whether a restraint is net procompetitive or net anticompetitive,
allowing procompetitive benefits in one market to be weighed against
anticompetitive effects in another is illogical and weakens antitrust
protections.146 In other words, the NCAA’s strongest proffered
procompetitive justification of maintaining amateurism for the sake of
consumer demand should not be accepted in the first place.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court’s ruling
struck an appropriate balance between striking down an antitrust violation
and upholding the distinction between collegiate and professional sports and
held that the district court did not preempt the NCAA’s role as the
administrator of college sports.147 Because the same judge initially heard both
O’Bannon and Alston, and both subsequently went to the Ninth Circuit on
appeal, the NCAA expressed concern about the role a single court has had in
shaping collegiate athletics.148 The NCAA went on to petition the Supreme
141

Id. at 1267–69 (Smith, J., concurring).
E.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting justifications
offered that draft rules “produc[ed] better entertainment for the public, higher salaries for the players, and
increased financial security for the clubs,” because these had no procompetitive effects in the relevant
market—the market for players’ services).
143 See Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1082–83; O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1069–73 (9th Cir. 2015).
144 Alston II, 958 F.3d. at 1248 (quoting Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1067, 1097).
145 See Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1082–83; O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1069–73; see also Brief of
Antitrust Lawyers, supra note 58, at 11–12 (insisting that because the NCAA and its member institutions
are not-for-profit organizations, any procompetitive justification offered must be related to their
respective nonprofit missions, not a means of profit generation).
146 See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1269 (Smith, J., concurring).
147 See id. at 1263–64.
148 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 30–31, Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) (Nos. 20-512,
20-520) (arguing that the O’Bannon and Alston decisions effectively “install[] a single judge in California
142
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Court, including on this basis, resulting in the Court granting certiorari on a
case involving the NCAA for the first time in nearly four decades.149
C. The Supreme Court Opinion in Alston
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the NCAA’s appeal, but
because the student athletes did not renew their “across-the-board challenge
to the NCAA’s compensation restrictions” that the district court heard, the
Court did not review all challenges; instead, the Court only considered the
district court’s injunction against those NCAA rules that restricted
education-related benefits.150 The Court unanimously affirmed the Ninth
Circuit’s decision upholding the injunction, reasoning that both the Ninth
Circuit and the district court properly scrutinized the NCAA’s compensation
restrictions under the antitrust rule of reason analysis.151
The Court contended that the narrow injunction extended the NCAA
“considerable leeway” to still define education-related benefits and seek
modification of the injunction to reflect that definition.152 While
acknowledging that some would believe “the district court did not go far
enough” and would see the injunction as “a poor substitute for fuller
relief,”153 the Court maintained that resolving the national debate about
amateurism in college sports, though important, was not in its wheelhouse.154
The Court suggested if the NCAA wished to seek an antitrust exemption
based on the special characteristics of its industry, the NCAA should address
its appeal to Congress.155
While the Alston decision signified the end of the NCAA’s attempt to
defend its restrictions on education-related benefits, it symbolizes a much
as the superintendent of college sports eligibility, subject only to deferential review by the Ninth Circuit”).
The NCAA stated that it believes the district court decision was inconsistent with O’Bannon and the
Ninth Circuit decision was inconsistent with precedent set by the Supreme Court and other circuits. See
Donald Remy, NCAA Statement on Alston Decision, NCAA (Mar. 9, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/media-center/news/ncaa-statement-alston-decision [https://perma.cc/HUC5-ZRM5]; Donald
M. Remy, NCAA Statement Regarding Supreme Court Petition for Alston Case, NCAA (Oct. 15, 2020),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-statement-regarding-supreme-courtpetition-alston-case [https://perma.cc/8WPC-ZCV5].
149 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 148, at 4–6. The Supreme Court heard oral
argument on March 31, 2021. Amy Howe, Justices Announce Low-Key March Argument Session,
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 1, 2021, 2:22 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/02/justices-announce-lowkey-march-argument-session [https://perma.cc/NE5R-QQEV].
150 Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2145.
151 See id. at 2160–66 (noting the district court’s proper applications of antitrust scrutiny under a rule
of reason analysis to the NCAA’s compensation restrictions).
152 Id. at 2164.
153 Id. at 2166.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 2160.
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greater blow to the NCAA: the Court quashed the NCAA’s view that the
Board of Regents decision approved of the NCAA’s restrictions on studentathlete compensation, and that this approval would foreclose any meaningful
review of those restrictions.156 Asserting that the Justices “cannot agree” with
the notion that the NCAA enjoys a “judicially ordained immunity” from the
Sherman Act, the Court declined to overlook the NCAA’s restrictions merely
because the restraints at issue fell “at the intersection of higher education,
sports, and money.”157 The Court also dismissed the NCAA’s argument that
amateurism makes college sports immune from Section 1 scrutiny.158 Instead,
the Court emphasized the district court’s finding that the NCAA “had not
adopted any consistent definition” of amateurism, that the NCAA’s rules and
restrictions on compensation had changed over time, and that the NCAA
adopted restrictions on compensation “without any reference to
‘considerations of consumer demand’”; the Court further stated that some of
the restrictions were not even “necessary to preserve consumer demand.”159
D. Justice Kavanaugh’s Concurrence
While the Alston decision itself dealt a blow to the NCAA, Justice
Kavanaugh took it one step further in his concurrence, emphasizing that the
NCAA’s remaining compensation rules “raise serious questions under the
antitrust laws.”160 Kavanaugh reiterated that because the student athletes did
not renew their across-the-board challenge to the NCAA’s compensation
restrictions, the Court did not review them. Kavanaugh suggested, however,
that the NCAA may lack valid procompetitive justification to “pass muster
under ordinary rule of reason scrutiny.”161 He stressed that the argument that
athlete noncompensation is “the defining feature of college sports” is
“circular and unpersuasive.”162 He stated unequivocally that the NCAA is not
exempt from antitrust law, because—simply put—“[p]rice-fixing labor is
price-fixing labor.”163
Further, Kavanaugh highlighted the paradox that while student athletes,
who are predominantly Black and from lower socioeconomic backgrounds,
generate “billions of dollars in revenue” that contribute to “six- and sevenfigure salaries” of coaches, NCAA executives, conference commissioners,
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university presidents, and athletic directors, student athletes themselves
receive “little or nothing.”164 Kavanaugh’s observation bolsters this Note’s
suggestion that antitrust law be used to combat the racial inequity the
NCAA’s business model has perpetuated for years and empower Black
student athletes to seek the full value of their labor. With Kavanaugh’s
charge that the “NCAA’s business model would be flatly illegal in almost
any other industry in America,” his Alston concurrence is likely—and
possibly even intended—to encourage more challenges.165 Kavanaugh’s
invitation to litigate against the NCAA creates a new urgency in the
landscape of student-athlete-compensation litigation and legislation.
III. THE FUTURE OF STUDENT-ATHLETE COMPENSATION
Because the scope of the Supreme Court’s Alston decision was so
narrow and only addressed education-related benefits, the holding is unlikely
to result in sweeping changes to the landscape of college sports. Athletic
programs already provide certain education-related benefits, such as laptops
and tablets, to student athletes,166 so they are still free to provide additional
benefits that are arguably related to educational needs without interference
from the NCAA.167 While some schools may use this as an opportunity to
find a recruiting advantage, these benefits are unlikely to constitute enough
compensation to sway a significant number of students toward one school
over another. A school could theoretically attempt to use this as an avenue to
offer high-value items loosely related to some educational advantage, such
as a stipend for a car service or a car for courses that require off-campus
work.168 In the unlikely event schools do try this, the NCAA reserves the
power to define education-related benefits and can curb benefits it perceives
164

Id. at 2168 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2167. During oral argument, Justice Kavanaugh was “particularly aggressive” when
questioning the NCAA, alleging that schools were conspiring with competitors and characterizing their
justifications as “entirely circular and even somewhat disturbing.” Sean Gregory, Why the NCAA Should
Be Terrified of Supreme Court Justice Kavanaugh’s Concurrence, TIME (June 21, 2021, 6:24 PM),
https://time.com/6074583/ncaa-supreme-court-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/RG6Y-G6YZ].
166 See Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (explaining that the NCAA already
regulated providing computers to student athletes), aff’d, 958 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct.
2141.
167 Some courses typically attract more student athletes than others. If it becomes commonplace for
student athletes to enroll in photography classes, for example, athletic programs might informally tout
professional cameras for this class as a benefit when recruiting prospective student athletes.
168 Cf. Dennis Dodd, Breaking Down the NCAA’s Forthcoming Supreme Court Battle with Its Big
Brother Status and Amateurism at Stake, CBS SPORTS (Feb. 3, 2021, 1:45 PM), https://www.
cbssports.com/college-football/news/breaking-down-the-ncaas-forthcoming-supreme-court-battle-withits-big-brother-status-and-amateurism-at-stake/ [https://perma.cc/72T7-HDAY] (“If uncapped benefits
are allowed, Alabama could conceivably purchase a new [car] for their top players if they live on campus
as transportation would be deemed essential for them to get to class.”).
165
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as crossing the line into pay for play.169 Even so, although Alston’s narrow
holding itself will probably not induce comprehensive reform in the realm of
student-athlete compensation, the opinion taken as a whole, and Justice
Kavanaugh’s concurrence in particular, places a target on the NCAA’s
business model that critics can use to push for reform.
Because the Supreme Court largely dispelled the NCAA’s argument
that it should be exempt from antitrust law, NCAA compensation rules
setting the value of student-athlete labor artificially low are likely to receive
less deferential treatment from courts following Alston. This presents an
opportunity to use antitrust law as a vehicle to correct the NCAA’s
exploitative model. This Note considers paths forward through both
litigation and legislation, ultimately arguing for comprehensive federal
legislation that protects student athletes’ right to compensation.
A. Litigation
The student athletes’ decision not to renew the across-the-board
compensation challenge in Alston leaves the vast majority of student-athlete
compensation regulations still up for judicial review. Although the Supreme
Court previously denied certiorari for other NCAA antitrust challenges,170
Alston—and Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in particular—practically
invite further litigation challenging other NCAA compensation regulations.
An amended complaint citing Alston was filed in an existing class action
lawsuit—yet again in the Northern District of California—alleging that the
NCAA’s prohibition on student-athlete NIL compensation constitutes a
conspiracy to prevent student athletes from profiting from endorsement
deals.171 While the NCAA issued a temporary policy that allows schools to
decide whether their student athletes can receive compensation for their NIL,
the plaintiffs here hope to establish precedent that student athletes are
entitled to be compensated for their NIL and achieve a policy that allows
student athletes across the board to receive such compensation.172 In the
amended complaint, the plaintiffs highlighted the Supreme Court’s rejection
of the NCAA’s position that its amateurism model is not subject to standard

169

See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2164.
See, e.g., O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
171 Consolidated Amended Complaint at 5, In re Coll. Athlete NIL Litig., No. 4:20-cv-03919 CW
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021); see also Michael McCann, NCAA to Face More Collusion Claims in Wake of
Alston NIL Defeats, SPORTICO (June 28, 2021, 2:15 PM), https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/
2021/house-v-ncaa-legal-primer-1234632887/ [https://perma.cc/BN9K-C68N] (detailing potential future
cases that could impact the NCAA).
172 See Consolidated Amended Complaint, supra note 171, at 34.
170

1348

116:1319 (2022)

Antitrust Law vs. The Antiquated NCAA Compensation Model

antitrust analyses.173 The consolidated lawsuit originally began as three
different lawsuits filed by two current student athletes and one former one,174
so an uptick in similar suits is likely following Alston. Unlike in previous
cases, plaintiffs can now rely on the Court’s Alston decision when arguing
that restraints justified by amateurism should not be upheld under a rule of
reason analysis.175 Plaintiffs can also rely on Circuit Judge Smith’s reasoning
that procompetitive effects outside of the relevant market should not be
considered at all.176
Nevertheless, litigation may not be the most efficient means of
reforming the NCAA’s business model, as litigation can be remarkably
expensive.177 Under antitrust law, a fee-shifting provision, which mandates
that when a plaintiff prevails the defendant pays the legal fees of both parties,
could make litigation less prohibitive in cases in which the plaintiff is likely
to succeed.178 Yet cases can still take years to move through litigation, which
will delay the effective date of any reform and prevent thousands of student
athletes from reaping its benefits while they are still students. Furthermore,
the Court has already stated that Congress is the appropriate place for a
comprehensive reform of NCAA regulations to occur, so the Court may be
hesitant to massively reform the system itself.179 Instead, legislation may
prove the better avenue for student-athlete-compensation reform.
B. Legislation
At the same time as Alston was making its way through federal courts,
states, Congress, and the NCAA attempted to appease athletes’ concerns by
enacting a series of name, image, and likeness regulations to increase
student-athlete compensation.180 NIL rules govern a person’s ability to

173

See id. at 10; John Sigety, Collegiate Athlete Litigation: The Antitrust Class-Action Lawsuit that
Could End the NCAA, KANE RUSSELL COLEMAN LOGAN (Aug. 10, 2021), https://www.krcl.com/articles/
litigation-update/collegiate-athlete-litigation-the-antitrust-class-action-lawsuit-that-could-end-the-ncaa/
[https://perma.cc/4XY6-HEPA].
174 Sigety, supra note 173.
175 See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2158 (2021) (reiterating that even if upholding the tradition of
amateurism is accepted as a procompetitive benefit, that “do[es] not suggest that courts must reflexively
reject all challenges to the NCAA’s compensation restrictions”).
176 See Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1267–69 (9th Cir. 2020) (Smith, J., concurring), aff’d, 141 S. Ct.
2141.
177 See Litigation Can Be Inefficient and Expensive. Why Litigate?, PWC, https://www.pwc.com/
gx/en/services/forensics/dispute-services/litigation.html [https://perma.cc/44KT-WCCW].
178 See 15 U.S.C. § 4304(a).
179 See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2160.
180 See Dan Murphy, Everything You Need to Know About the NCAA’s NIL Debate, ESPN (Sept.
1, 2021), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/31086019/everything-need-know-ncaa-nildebate [https://perma.cc/25FG-U2WM].
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capitalize on their publicity and be compensated through avenues such as
endorsements, sponsorships, autographs, or lessons.181 Eager to prevent
outsiders from commandeering the role of governing college sports, the
NCAA agreed to “modernize” its NIL rules prior to the Alston decision;182
the NCAA board of governors directed the three NCAA divisions to suggest
new regulations that allow athletes to earn endorsement money while
maintaining the collegiate model.183 The NCAA later introduced historic rule
changes, set for a vote in January 2021, that would uniformly allow student
athletes to accept endorsement money without risking their eligibility for
competition.184 However, after the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
NCAA’s appeal of Alston, the Department of Justice sent a letter warning
the NCAA of possible antitrust implications of any rule changes.185
Subsequently, the Division I Council—the penultimate stage in the NCAA’s
rulemaking procedure—decided to delay its vote on the proposal
indefinitely.186 Because of the Department of Justice warning of potential
antitrust violations if the Association sought to restrict NIL rules, the NCAA
is unlikely to impose NIL restrictions without congressional input.
Once it became clear that neither a federal NIL law nor new NCAA
regulations were imminent, six conferences (including three of the Power
Five—the SEC, ACC, and Pac-12) proposed a new plan.187 The proposal
directed schools in states with NIL laws set to go into effect in less than two
weeks to follow the laws of their respective states and made schools in states

181 See Katie McInerney, What Is NIL? NCAA Rules Are Changing Regarding Athlete Pay. Here’s
What It Means, BOS. GLOBE (July 2, 2021, 10:57 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/06/30/
sports/ncaa-nil-rules-change/ [https://perma.cc/GH24-D8TB].
182 See Murphy, supra note 180.
183 See Dan Murphy, NCAA Clears Way for Athletes to Profit from Names, Images and Likenesses,
ESPN (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/27957981/ncaa-clears-wayathletes-profit-names-images-likenesses [https://perma.cc/B9DW-FKZF].
184 See Pat Forde & Ross Dellenger, NCAA’s Name, Image, Likeness Legislation Proposal Revealed
in Documents, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.si.com/college/2020/10/13/ncaaproposal-athlete-compensation-name-image-likeness [https://perma.cc/8WVA-LLWN] (proposing a
bylaw change that would allow student athletes to be compensated for their names, images, and likenesses
for private lessons, camps, clinics, endorsements, and autograph sessions).
185 See Steve Berkowitz & Christine Brennan, Justice Department Warns NCAA over Transfer and
Name, Image, Likeness Rules, USA TODAY (Jan. 8, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/ncaaf/2021/01/08/justice-department-warns-ncaa-over-transfer-and-money-making-rules/
6599747002/ [https://perma.cc/FT2A-TYR3].
186 See Dan Murphy & Adam Rittenberg, NCAA Delays Vote to Change College Athlete
Compensation Rules, ESPN (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/30694073/
sources-ncaa-delays-vote-change-college-athlete-compensation-rules [https://perma.cc/EJL6-KYTQ].
187 See Murphy, supra note 180.
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without NIL laws responsible for developing their own NIL guidelines, with
only a couple of restrictions.188
Following the Supreme Court’s Alston decision and on the eve—
literally—of NIL laws going into effect in twelve states that would make it
impossible for schools to comply with both existing NCAA regulations and
state law, the NCAA decided to act.189 The Association adopted a temporary
rule urging schools to set their own NIL rules based on minimal guidelines
intended to prevent pay-for-play deals and recruiting inducements.190
Allowing student athletes to seek third-party endorsement deals and
profit from their own NIL is a step in the right direction, but it does not
address the disparity in the NCAA’s business model that redirects billions of
dollars from student athletes’ labor to university, conference, and NCAA
officials.191 The NCAA should not be allowed to punt the responsibility of
compensating student athletes to third parties to make up for its own
artificially low valuations of student-athlete labor.
Several states took advantage of the new NCAA policy, quickly passing
NIL laws.192 The new NIL rules allowed student athletes to be compensated
for these activities for the first time.193 Many of these state statutes have
already gone into effect, allowing student athletes at schools in those states
to sign endorsement deals and begin profiting from their NIL.194

188 See Dan Murphy, College Conference Commissioners Pushing Minimalist Plan to Regulate NIL,
ESPN (June 20, 2021), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/31675595/college-conferencecommissioners-pushing-minimalist-plan-regulate-nil [https://perma.cc/4QJK-WJU4].
189 See Murphy, supra note 180. NIL laws went into effect in two additional states later that month.
Id.
190 Id.; Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Adopts Interim Name, Image and Likeness Policy, NCAA
(June 30, 2021), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-adopts-interim-nameimage-and-likeness-policy [https://perma.cc/H6VK-YANL].
191 See Lawrence M. Kahn, Markets: Cartel Behavior and Amateurism in College Sports, 21 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 209, 219 (2007).
192 See Murphy, supra note 180.
193 See, e.g., Associated Press, The NCAA and the Impact of NIL Compensation, Explained, DENVER
POST (July 1, 2021, 7:23 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2021/07/01/ncaa-nil-compensation-impactexplainer/ [https://perma.cc/L8YL-9L6X] (explaining that when NIL laws in several states went into
effect on July 1, 2021, “thousands of college athletes [would] be able to earn a form of compensation that
has been barred for decades by regulations put in place by the NCAA, conferences, schools, or a
combination of all of them”).
194 As of March 2022, NIL legislation has already gone into effect in twenty-two states. See Thomas
Di Biasio, Most States Pass “Name, Image, and Likeness” Laws for Student Athletes, MULTISTATE (Sept.
21, 2021), https://www.multistate.us/insider/2021/9/21/most-states-pass-name-image-and-likeness-lawsfor-student-athletes [https://perma.cc/4Z6A-M8NU]; NIL Legislation Tracker, SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN
& LEHR LLP, https://www.saul.com/nil-legislation-tracker [https://perma.cc/S76U-MH42].

1351

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1. State Legislation
State and federal legislation have targeted different aspects of studentathlete compensation. Shortly after the Northern District of California issued
its Alston ruling in 2019, California passed the Fair Pay to Play Act,195
prohibiting universities in California from punishing student athletes for
accepting endorsement money.196 Colorado quickly followed suit.197 While
these laws initially were not set to go into effect until 2023, Florida’s passage
of an NIL law with an effective date of July 1, 2021 accelerated the general
timeline.198 Twenty-nine states in total have passed NIL legislation, and
twenty-two states’ NIL laws have already gone into effect.199 In addition,
many states without NIL legislation in place are actively pursuing such
legislation.200 Twenty-two states that have passed NIL legislation did so
during 2021—several of them following either the Alston Supreme Court
hearing or decision201—indicating how much momentum this case has
created. The widespread adoption and support also cast doubt on the
NCAA’s notion that the public holds the tradition of amateurism near and
dear and that compensating student athletes would negatively impact
consumer demand, further weaking the NCAA’s strongest justification for
not compensating student athletes.

195 See S.B. 206, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); Jack Kelly, Newly Passed California Fair Pay
to Play Act Will Allow Student Athletes to Receive Compensation, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2019, 12:36 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2019/10/01/in-a-revolutionary-change-newly-passed-californiafair-pay-to-play-act-will-allow-student-athletes-to-receive-compensation/
[https://perma.cc/KP434ZQ8].
196 Michael McCann, What’s Next After California Signs Game Changer Fair Pay to Play Act into
Law?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/09/30/fair-pay-to-playact-law-ncaa-california-pac-12 [https://perma.cc/WW78-D3X9].
197 Compensation and Representation of Student Athletes Act, S.B. 20-123, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 2020); see also Lauren Lyster, Jeffrey Martino & Elizabeth McCurrach, BakerHostetler, NCAA
Moves on Multiple Fronts, JDSUPRA (July 28, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ncaa-moveson-multiple-fronts-84084/ [https://perma.cc/644N-8M63] (explaining that some states followed
California by passing NIL legislation).
198 See Lyster et al., supra note 197; S.B. 20-123. In June 2021, the effective date of the
Compensation and Representation of Student Athletes Act was moved up from January 1, 2023 to July
1, 2021. See H.B. 21-1328, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021).
199 See Di Biasio, supra note 194. Virginia’s NIL law was initially put in place for the 2021–2022
athletics season and set to expire in June 2022. See Ross Broudy, What Is All the Hype Around Name,
Image, and Likeness in Virginia’s College Sports?: An Introduction to Virginia NIL Laws, PENDER &
COWARD (Dec. 27, 2021), https://www.pendercoward.com/resources/blog-opinions-and-observations/
what-is-all-the-hype-around-name-image-and-likeness-in-virginia-s-college-sports-an-introduction-tovirginia-nil-laws/#_ednref26 [https://perma.cc/D7GL-GGN8].
200 Murphy, supra note 180 (noting that Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island all have
pending legislation originally scheduled to be signed into law in 2021 or 2022).
201 See Di Biasio, supra note 194.
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The problem with these new state laws is that they have created a
patchwork system of NIL legislation that allows students at schools in one
state to receive endorsement money, while students in a state just across the
border may be ineligible to compete if they accept endorsements. NIL laws
have already gone into effect in several states that are home to powerhouse
institutions that regularly win championships and produce draft picks—such
as Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, South Carolina, and
Texas—giving schools in these states an edge on recruiting prospective
student athletes who are interested in endorsement deals.202 In a conference
where schools in states with different rules are competing against each other,
the uneven playing field may undermine NCAA regulations intended to
support uniformity across the field because the “integrity of the product” can
only be preserved through mutual agreement.203 This is likely to be a shortterm problem; as many more states pass NIL legislation, states that have not
passed NIL legislation will likely feel pressure from schools worried about
being disadvantaged when recruiting. Nonetheless, federal legislation would
preempt or displace state legislation and ensure all schools abide by uniform
guidelines. Therefore, it is time to pass the baton to Congress.
2. Federal Legislation
Given the problems a patchwork of state regulations presents for
student athletes, federal legislation would be the best method to ensure
student athletes at schools in all states are afforded equal NIL opportunities.
Several bills have been introduced in Congress in the past few years designed
to address different NCAA regulations, including an explicit antitrust
exemption,204 eligibility, NIL rights, student-athlete compensation, and

202

Id.
See O’Bannon II, 803 F.3d 1049, 1069 (9th Cir. 2015) (asserting that “the integrity of the
‘product’ cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement” (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S.
85, 102 (1984))).
204 Senator Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) introduced a bill that included this exemption, but it was considered
a nonstarter by many in Congress. See Lyster et al., supra note 197; Marc Edelman, Why Congress Would
Be Crazy to Grant the NCAA an Antitrust Exemption, FORBES (May 6, 2020, 9:50 AM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2020/05/06/why-congress-would-be-crazy-to-grant-the-ncaa-an-antitrust
-exemption [https://perma.cc/V8FJ-EYAU] (noting that removing the threat of antitrust challenges would
make “NCAA leaders . . . less likely to make future voluntary concessions to their athlete labor force”);
Thaddeus Kennedy, NCAA and an Antitrust Exemption: The Death of College Athletes’ Rights, HARV. J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. (Aug. 31, 2020), https://harvardjsel.com/2020/08/ncaa-and-an-antitrust-exemptionthe-death-of-college-athletes-rights/ [https://perma.cc/J5KR-FSLT] (arguing that an antitrust exemption
would remove “the primary avenue through which student-athletes have been able to protest unfair
NCAA regulations”).
203
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student athletes’ employee classification.205 Multiple bills have been
introduced in Congress to varying levels of bipartisan support.206 While some
of them have been criticized as “too NCAA-friendly”207 and overly restrictive
on student-athlete compensation, three proposals stand out for features that
show promise for advancing the efforts to compensate student athletes.
a. The College Athlete Economic Freedom Act
The College Athlete Economic Freedom Act (CAEFA), coauthored by
Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Representative Lori Trahan (D-Mass.),
does not provide for Congress or the NCAA to regulate what products

205 See, e.g., Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act, H.R. 2841, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021) (focusing
on NIL regulations and restrictions); Collegiate Athlete Compensation Rights Act, S. 5003, 116th Cong.
§§ 3–4 (2020) (focusing on student athletes’ rights relating to NIL compensation); College Athlete
Economic Freedom Act, S. 238, 117th Cong. § 3 (2021) (proposing a framework that allows student
athletes to receive compensation for their NIL with relatively few restrictions).
206 The Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act has received the most bipartisan support so far.
Introduced by Representatives Anthony Gonzales (R-Ohio) and Emmanuel Cleaver (D-Mo.), the bill
would give student athletes the ability to be compensated for their NIL through endorsements and
sponsorship deals but would not entitle student athletes to receive any of the revenues their labor
generated. This proposal also seems to be the favorite of the NCAA so far because it would placate critics
of the current model by allowing student athletes to earn some money, while not requiring schools,
conferences, or coaches to share their salaries. See Dan Murphy, Bipartisan Federal Bill Introduced for
College Sports, ESPN (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/29961059/
bipartisan-federal-nil-bill-introduced-college-sports [https://perma.cc/5R84-NNWG]; Mogin Rubin,
House Bill Would Allow College Athletes to Capitalize on Their Fame, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 29, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/house-bill-would-allow-college-athletes-to-capitalize-their-fame
[https://perma.cc/W3YS-UMZX]. For its part, the NCAA believes the bill will “strengthen the college
athlete experience and support the NCAA and its members to modernize [NIL] rules, but not pay studentathletes or turn them into employees of their colleges and universities.” NCAA Statement on GonzalezCleaver Bill, NCAA (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaastatement-gonzalez-cleaver-bill-0 [https://perma.cc/S6RF-JCF9].
207 For instance, in December 2020, the Collegiate Athlete Compensation Rights Act was introduced
by Senator Roger Wicker (R-Miss.). This bill would give student athletes the ability to be compensated
for their NIL without risking eligibility; however, any person defined as a “booster” would not be able to
pay to use an athlete’s NIL, significantly restricting the market since the definition of booster—an
individual or entity that directly or indirectly provides a donation to obtain season tickets for a sport at a
university or makes a financial contribution to the athletics department that exceeds a predetermined
amount—is so broad. S. 5003 §§ 2(2)(A)–(F). Senator Wicker’s bill has received criticism for being too
narrow, conservative, and “NCAA-friendly” and is therefore unlikely to become the frontrunner among
possible federal legislation. See, e.g., Ross Dellenger, Latest Congressional NIL Bill Would Allow
Athletes to Enter Draft and Return to College, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 24, 2021) (characterizing
Senator Wicker’s bill as “restrictive” and “right-leaning”). The Amateur Athletes Protection and
Compensation Act, introduced by Senator Jerry Moran (R-Kan.), is designed to protect student athletes
from risking their eligibility for entering into endorsement deals or receiving compensation and has
received similar criticism for being too narrow. See id. It also specifically seeks to ensure student athletes
are not considered employees. See Amateur Athletes Protection and Compensation Act of 2021, S. 414,
117th Cong. § 5 (2021).
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student athletes endorse.208 Other proposed bills include provisions
restricting student athletes from endorsing certain companies and products
(such as gambling, adult entertainment, tobacco, and alcohol); prohibiting
endorsements of brands that compete with school athletic sponsors; or
restricting prospective student athletes from accepting endorsement
money.209 The CAEFA’s sponsors intentionally did not include these
restrictions in their proposed bill because “[i]f predominantly white coaches
and NCAA executives can have unfettered endorsement deals, why
shouldn’t predominantly black athletes be afforded the same opportunity?”210
The CAEFA would also prohibit the NCAA or conferences from preventing
athletes from organizing through collective representation to sell licensing
rights as a group,211 a practice usually employed when bargaining for media
rights, video games, and jersey sales.212 This bill intentionally aims to correct
disparities between the rights afforded to predominantly Black student
athletes and those afforded to the predominantly white coaches and
administrators who profit from athletes’ labor, making the CAEFA the most
appealing proposal from a racial-justice perspective.213 Yet the CAEFA
would still require student athletes either to actively seek and negotiate
endorsement deals with third parties on an individual or group basis or to
rely on their athletic departments to act in their best interests in such
negotiations.214 These options either prevent student athletes from being
empowered to advocate for themselves or force them to individually expend
additional efforts to negotiate their own deals, a system that would be replete
with inefficiencies. For these reasons, the CAEFA does not achieve the
sweeping reform for which advocates are calling.
208 See Press Release, Lori Trahan, House of Representatives, Trahan, Murphy Introduce Legislation
to Allow College Athletes to Make Money Off Their Name, Image and Likeness (Feb. 4, 2021)
[hereinafter Trahan Press Release], https://trahan.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=
1967 [https://perma.cc/Q4ZQ-V2VW]; S. 238.
209 See, e.g., H.R. 2841 § 2(b) (prohibiting endorsement contracts involving tobacco, alcohol,
marijuana and other controlled substances, casinos, and “adult entertainment business[es]”).
210 Trahan Press Release, supra note 208.
211 S. 238 § 3(a)(3)–(4).
212 NIL FAQs: Group Licensing, KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, https://www.
knightcommission.org/nil-faqs-group-licensing/ [https://perma.cc/33AA-TXJZ].
213 See Trahan Press Release, supra note 208.
214 Since new NIL legislation went into effect, athletic departments at some universities have
negotiated deals available for all members of a team. An assistant athletic director at Georgia Tech helped
secure a sponsorship with a technology brand that resulted in the ninety football team members who
accepted the offer receiving a prepaid debit card, streaming device, and branded gear in exchange for
making two social media posts. Ken Sugiura, TiVo Signs NIL Deal with 90 Georgia Tech Football
Players, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 2, 2021), https://www.ajc.com/sports/georgia-tech/tivo-signs-nildeal-with-90-georgia-tech-football-players/4WZOZFYJV5ENDB72LA5SKS7BWU/ [https://perma.cc/
2WUY-GUHX].
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b. The College Athletes Bill of Rights
The College Athletes Bill of Rights (CABR), introduced by Senators
Cory Booker (D-N.J.), Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), Kirsten Gillibrand
(D-N.Y.), and Brian Schatz (D-Haw.), proposes a much broader reform that
enables direct compensation to student athletes instead of simply passing the
buck to third parties in the form of endorsements.215 In addition to allowing
student athletes to profit from their NIL rights with minimal restrictions on
the types of sponsorship and endorsement agreements, this bill would require
schools to share profits with the student athletes who play those sports.216 It
also includes provisions that would allow for the possibility of group
licensing with other student athletes217 and extends guaranteed scholarships
for the length of a student athlete’s undergraduate career.218 The bill also
proposes reforms that would protect student athletes and provide them with
benefits such as healthcare, health and safety standards, athlete-friendly
transfer and draft rules, prohibitions on free-speech restrictions, and
academic guidelines.219 The CABR proposal calls for “sweeping,
comprehensive overhaul” of current athlete-compensation regulations and
has received support outside of Congress.220 But this bill has yet to receive
bipartisan support, and any version that passes will likely be scaled back in
order to drum up enough support from both sides of the aisle.
c. The College Athlete Right to Organize Act
The College Athlete Right to Organize Act (CAROA), introduced by
Senators Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.),221 bypasses
the issues of NIL rights and revenue sharing altogether. This bill proposes
classifying student athletes as employees and amending the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) to allow collective bargaining at any college.222
215

College Athletes Bill of Rights, S. 5062, 116th Cong. § 5(b)(2) (2020).
See id. §§ 3(a), 5(b)(2); Press Release, Cory Booker, Senate, Senators Booker and Blumenthal
Introduce College Athletes Bill of Rights (Dec. 17, 2020) [hereinafter Booker Press Release],
https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/senators-booker-and-blumenthal-introduce-college-athletesbill-of-rights [https://perma.cc/7KDE-GXDJ] (“It will also require revenue-generating sports to share 50
percent of their profit with the athletes from that sport after accounting for the cost of scholarships.”).
217 College Athletes Bill of Rights, S. 5062 § 3(a)(2).
218 Id. § 8(a)(1).
219 Id. §§ 3(d)(1), 3(e), 3(g)(2), 7–8.
220 When originally introduced in 2020, the Act was endorsed by the National College Players
Association, Color of Change, and the University of Baltimore’s Director for the Center of Sports and
Law, among others. See Booker Press Release, supra note 216.
221 College Athlete Right to Organize Act, H.R. 3895, 117th Cong. § 1 (2021).
222 Id. § 3(a)(2), 3(b); see Molly Hensley-Clancy, Senate Democrats Introduce Bill to Allow College
Athletes to Unionize, WASH. POST (May 27, 2021, 1:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/
2021/05/27/college-athletes-unions-legislation-bernie-sanders-chris-murphy/ [https://perma.cc/LY6F5VQS].
216

1356

116:1319 (2022)

Antitrust Law vs. The Antiquated NCAA Compensation Model

Collective bargaining involves a negotiation between an employer and a
group of workers to form an agreement that governs the terms of the workers’
employment.223 Terms negotiated can include mutually agreed-upon
conditions of employment, benefits, and wage guidelines.224
The possibility of collective bargaining for student athletes came to
attention recently when Northwestern University football players pushed for
unionization to allow collective bargaining in 2015.225 In response, the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) refused to take any action,
reasoning that because it did not have jurisdiction over all member
institutions in the conference, the NLRB could not fashion a remedy that
would impact the entire landscape of college sports.226 However, the NLRB
general counsel recently switched course and declared that because student
athletes “perform services for their colleges and the NCAA . . . and [are]
subject to their control,” student athletes are employees.227 Despite declining
to opine in 2015, the NLRB general counsel reasoned that the “significant
developments in the law, NCAA regulations, and the societal landscape . . .
demonstrate that traditional notions that [student athletes] are amateurs have
changed.”228 This announcement also specified that the NLRB may decide to
assert jurisdiction over the NCAA or athletic conferences, even when a
member institution is a public state school.229 The assertion that
“misclassifying such employees as mere ‘student-athletes’, and leading them
to believe that they do not have statutory protections is a violation of [the
National Labor Relations Act]” indicates that the NLRB would be more
inclined to intervene in disputes in the future when allegations of unfair labor
practices due to employees not being compensated arise.230 This would likely

223

Collective Bargaining, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
collective%20bargaining [https://perma.cc/ML5S-XHYG].
224 See id.
225 See Hensley-Clancy, supra note 222.
226 See id.
227 Memorandum from Jennifer A. Abruzzo, General Counsel, NLRB, to All Reg’l Dirs., Officersin-Charge, and Resident Officers 3 (Sept. 29, 2021), https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/
09031d458356ec26 [https://perma.cc/4BT8-5DV8].
228 Id. at 5.
229 Id. at 9.
230 Id. at 1. “[T]he [NLRB’s] jurisdiction is very broad and covers the great majority of nongovernment employers with a workplace in the United States, including non-profits, employee-owned
businesses, labor organizations, non-union businesses, and businesses in states with ‘Right to Work’
laws.” Jurisdictional Standards, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/the-law/
jurisdictional-standards [https://perma.cc/QZT7-WANR].

1357

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

lead to more inefficient, drawn-out, and costly litigation.231 Because
collective bargaining gives athletes agency and empowers them to seek just
compensation, and because the NLRB Enforcement Agency has been
instructed to protect these rights for student athletes, the CAROA is the best
and most efficient option available.
There are several arguments for why collective bargaining is the
preferred vehicle to achieve student-athlete compensation reform. First,
professional leagues—including the NBA and NFL, in which Black athletes
make up the majority of the rosters232—engage in collective bargaining. The
collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the NFL and the
National Football League Player Association (NFLPA) establishes the share
of league revenue NFL players receive, minimum salaries, and a salary-cap
ceiling.233 The agreement benefits the league, which can ensure some
standardization across teams; benefits teams, which have a greater sense of
certainty and maintain flexibility in budget allocation; and benefits
individual players, who can guarantee baseline protections.234 Student
athletes already have a players’ association similar to professional league
players’ associations in place. The National College Players Association

231 Since Abruzzo’s memorandum, the National College Players Association (NCPA) and a separate
student-athlete advocate have filed charges with the NLRB alleging unfair labor practices committed by
the NCAA, but many experts anticipate resolution taking a minimum of eighteen months from the filing
date because of the “long and winding” nature of the process. See Ross Dellenger, NCPA Takes Next Step
Toward College Athletes Being Classified as Employees, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 8, 2022), https://
www.si.com/college/2022/02/08/ncaa-student-athletes-vs-employees-debate-big-step [https://perma.cc/
5C2N-TV93]. Because the NCPA filed charges against a private university (the University of Southern
California) and a public university (the University of California, Los Angeles), this would provide the
NLRB with the opportunity to assert jurisdiction over a public university, making its decision applicable
to colleges nationwide. See id.
232 The Institute for Diversity and Ethics in Sports reported that during each of their respective
seasons that began in 2020, 73.2% of NBA players were Black and 57.5% of NFL players were Black.
RICHARD E. LAPCHICK, INST. FOR DIVERSITY & ETHICS IN SPORT, THE 2021 RACIAL AND GENDER
REPORT CARD: NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 10 (Aug. 25, 2021), https://43530132-36e9-4f52811a-182c7a91933b.filesusr.com/ugd/138a69_4b2910360b754662b5f3cb52675d0faf.pdf [https://perma
.cc/AU6D-7VZM]; RICHARD E. LAPCHICK, INST. FOR DIVERSITY & ETHICS IN SPORT, THE 2020 RACIAL
AND GENDER REPORT CARD: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 8 (Dec. 9, 2020), https://43530132-36e94f52-811a-182c7a91933b.filesusr.com/ugd/138a69_8715a573a51742ce95dddeb0461cfc82.pdf [https://
perma.cc/HQB6-HBGT].
233 See Dan Graziano, NFL CBA Approved: What Players Get in New Deal, How Expanded Playoffs
and Schedule Will Work, ESPN (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/28901832/nfl-cbaapproved-players-get-new-deal-how-expanded-playoffs-schedule-work [https://perma.cc/WU7B-39PU]
(discussing in detail the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the NFL and the NFLPA).
234 Like in intercollegiate athletics, mutually agreed-upon horizontal restraints are necessary to
prevent some teams from gaining an unfair recruiting advantage. See supra note 114 and accompanying
text. They also provides more predictability for the team, by removing the possibility of labor strikes and
allowing them to budget and plan ahead, and ensure uniform salary minimums, benefits, and working
conditions for individual players.
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(NCPA) is an advocacy group that acts as the voice of student athletes and
has actively pursued more protections and rights for student athletes through
antitrust litigation involving the NCAA and state legislation.235 The NCPA
could negotiate on behalf of its student-athlete members and achieve the
protections the CABR seeks without depending on Congress to overcome
partisan disagreement.
Second, as the landscape of college sports continues to rapidly evolve,
and with the NLRB’s recent announcement, right now is an opportune time
for student athletes to unionize and engage in collective bargaining. The
SEC—set to expand to sixteen teams in the near future—is poised to become
a super conference,236 which has caused three of the remaining Power Five
conferences to form a coalition in response to “stabilize a volatile
environment.”237 These recent developments will undoubtedly affect
different aspects of competition and student athletes’ experiences and
increase media rights revenues.238 With conferences and schools set to earn
even more in the coming years, instituting collective bargaining now can
help student athletes ensure that they receive fair compensation for their
labor and that the disparity between student athletes and university and
conference executives does not continue to grow.
There are concerns that the successful collective bargaining process
employed by professional athletes may not transfer to student athletes. One
is that professional athletes in the NBA and NFL are highly compensated
and can contribute to a players’ fund to provide players with a source of
funds in the event of a strike, while student athletes do not have the financial

See NCPA Accomplishments, NAT’L COLL. PLAYERS ASS’N, https://www.ncpanow.org/about/
accomplishments [https://perma.cc/M2YD-H9N4].
236 See Brian Smith, Conference Realignment, the ‘Pact’ Against the SEC, and the Group of Five Part I, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 14, 2021), https://www.si.com/college/ucf/university-of-centralflorida-football/conference-realignment-and-the-pact [https://perma.cc/DT9Z-PRKH].
237 Alan Blinder, A.C.C., Big Ten and Pac-12 Form Coalition to Counter SECʼs Might, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/24/sports/ncaafootball/acc-bigten-pac12-sec.html
[https://perma.cc/P8AU-K8A9] (explaining the recent changes within conference structures and the
reactive measures taken to combat the SEC’s growing power).
238 See Emily Caron & Michael McCann, Big Ten, ACC, Pac-12 Align as Alston Antitrust Warning
Looms, SPORTICO (Aug. 24, 2021, 4:48 PM), https://www.sportico.com/leagues/college-sports/2021/bigten-acc-pac-12-alliance-1234637751/ [https://perma.cc/DEN6-TVAZ]. Oklahoma and Texas joining the
SEC will likely allow the SEC to negotiate a more lucrative media-rights agreement with ESPN, and an
alliance between the ACC, Big Ten, and Pac-12 will lead to additional marquee interconference matchups
and likely an increase in media-rights revenues for those conferences as well. See id. This would result
in a larger pool of revenue and more money that players are currently excluded from, making this an
opportune time to implement a revenue-sharing model.
235
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ability to contribute to a similar fund.239 However, this concern should not be
alarming for several reasons. First, strikes are extraordinarily rare in
intercollegiate athletics, so it is unlikely that a strike would occur.240 In the
event there is a strike, student athletes’ expenses are very different from
those of professional athletes, and comparing student athletes receiving
royalties in addition to financial aid to professional athletes’ reliance on their
salary would be comparing apples to oranges. Another way to sidestep this
concern would be to structure the royalty so that it is held in a trust account
until the student athlete leaves the university after joining a professional
league, transferring to another institution, or graduating.241 If student athletes
could not access their deferred royalty-based compensation during their
collegiate careers, there would be no need for a player fund in the event of a
strike. Nonetheless, if student athletes are successfully able to negotiate a
compensation agreement, this financial concern may soon be moot because
student athletes should be able to build a substantial players’ fund with direct
compensation and income permitted by new NIL rules.
There is also concern that unionizing would jeopardize antitrust rights,
because there is a nonstatutory labor exemption to antitrust law that
essentially means labor law trumps antitrust law in the context of collective
bargaining agreements.242 While this is a valid concern, there is still an
integral role for antitrust in the collective bargaining process. As long as
knowledgeable antitrust counsel is involved in negotiations and adequately
advises the NCPA of student athletes’ rights under antitrust law, the NCPA
should not agree to any terms that would disadvantage student athletes and
the labor exemption should not negatively affect student athletes’ rights.
Moreover, not all circuits apply the labor exemption uniformly, and there
may be some instances in which it would not apply at all.243 The line between

239 See Marc Edelman, Unionizing College Football Players Represents a Double-Edged Sword,
FORBES (Aug. 10, 2021, 10:18 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2021/08/10/unionizingcollege-football-players-is-a-double-edged-sword/?sh=152579f702d7 [https://perma.cc/MX25-C8ST].
240 See Andy Staples, Flipping the Script: Missouri Strike Proves that Players, Not the NCAA, Hold
the Power in Collegiate Athletics, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.si.com/college/
2015/11/09/missouri-footballs-strike-proves-ultimate-power-lies-players [https://perma.cc/D9JY-C3Y7]
(discussing how notable it was that the Missouri football team threatened to boycott a game—but did not
follow through—because such boycotts are so uncommon).
241 See Charles Grantham, It Is Time to Share Revenue with Collegiate Athletes, HARV. J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. (Aug. 31, 2020), https://harvardjsel.com/2020/08/it-is-time-to-share-revenue-with-collegiateathletes/ [https://perma.cc/U6XA-XHKL] (explaining how a deferred-compensation framework could be
structured).
242 See Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker, Collectively Bargained Age/Education Requirements:
A Source of Antitrust Risk for Sports Club-Owners or Labor Risk for Players Unions?, 115 PENN ST. L.
REV. 341, 365 (2011).
243 See id. at 366.
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collegiate athletes and professional athletes has been blurred for years, so a
logical next step is applying a process that has proven successful in
professional sports to student athletes.
The NCAA has condemned the CAROA, arguing that it would “directly
undercut the purpose of college: earning a degree.”244 But it is arguably one
of the worst kept secrets in the athletics community that Division I football
and basketball players are already treated more like professional athletes than
like students.245 Maintaining the myth of amateurism to justify not paying
student athletes causes disparate harm to Black student athletes246 and should
not continue to be proffered as a procompetitive justification for a primary
labor market that does not consider the benefits amateurism allegedly
confers, especially since these benefits remain unproven.247 Acknowledging
that the landscape of college sports has changed since the NCAA’s
inception—becoming
a
multibillion-dollar
industry
due
to
commercialization248—and reclassifying student athletes as employees to
reflect these changes is the most equitable solution for students. Any
shortsighted solutions that do not admit that this evolution necessitates major
changes are simply prolonging the changes that will inevitably come through
litigation, student athletes’ activism, or other means.
C. The Ideal Federal Legislation
At a time when the landscape of college sports is changing so rapidly,
Congress should take the ball and run, using the momentum to accomplish
as much positive change as possible. Because some of the bills target
different possible avenues for compensating student athletes, the best path
forward could involve a combination of the nonoverlapping proposed bills.
The CAEFA is the most intentional about correcting the racial injustice that
the NCAA’s amateurism model has perpetuated for decades. But the
ambitious CABR has the most comprehensive plan for protecting student
athletes financially, academically, and physically and is likely to result in the
greatest reform. However, because the CABR is so comprehensive, it is
likely to receive some pushback from more conservative Congress

244 NCAA Statement on Murphy-Sanders Bill, NCAA (May 27, 2021), https://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/media-center/news/ncaa-statement-murphy-sanders-bill [https://perma.cc/T88L-AJR8].
245 See Brief of Antitrust Lawyers, supra note 58, at 6–9.
246 See supra Section I.C.
247 See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2162 (2021) (noting that the district court reasoned the NCAA
failed to “establish that the challenged compensation rules . . . have any direct connection to consumer
demand” (quoting Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019))); supra note 87.
248 See Murphy, supra note 90, at 3–4 (explaining the evolution of college sports economics and how
revenues had increased to approximately $14 billion as of 2017).
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members,249 so realistically it will probably need to be pared down to receive
enough support. Consequently, the CAROA’s proposal to classify student
athletes as employees would enable student athletes to engage in collective
bargaining to achieve the comprehensive reforms the CABR proposes
without needing to depend on a divided Congress for further action after
enacting the CAROA.
Furthermore, recent changes within conferences have raised the
question of whether additional antitrust challenges to the NCAA’s
regulations will arise. The antitrust exemption may provide the unintended
benefit of enticing the NCAA to engage in collective bargaining, as the
exemption would grant the greater antitrust protection the NCAA has
unsuccessfully lobbied for.250 Alston dealt a serious blow to the NCAA’s
model and all but opened the floodgates of future antitrust litigation. The
NCAA may be more willing to negotiate and reach an agreement that
satisfies the needs of student athletes if it can avoid future losses in court
and, in the absence of further judicial intervention, maintain some control
over its business model. With an antitrust exemption for collective
bargaining, it would be imperative for the NCPA to work closely with
antitrust counsel to ensure student athletes do not forfeit the right to bring
important challenges in the future.
D. Remaining Questions
Because the legal landscape surrounding student-athlete compensation
is constantly evolving, with new legislation and proposals coming every
month,251 there are still several questions that need to be answered. These
questions include whether compensation would be standardized across all
players on a team (i.e., a starting player receiving the same compensation as
a walk-on252) and whether athletes across all sports or only profitable sports
would receive the same compensation.253
249

See supra Section III.B.2.b.
See Kennedy, supra note 204.
251 See Murphy, supra note 180.
252 “Walk-on” students first matriculate at schools through the normal application and admissions
process. Because they are not recruited to those schools to play on specific teams, they generally do not
receive full athletic scholarships. See The Five Most Common College Walk-On Questions, SPORTS
ENGINE (July 10, 2018), https://www.sportsengine.com/recruiting/five-most-common-college-walkquestions [https://perma.cc/TJD7-6MY7].
253 The approach proposed in the CABR limits the number of teams eligible to receive compensation
to “athletic program[s] that participate[] in a division or subdivision for which 50 percent of the total
commercial sports NIL revenue of every institution . . . that participates in the division or subdivision is
greater than the total amount of grant-in-aid” provided to student athletes in those athletic programs.
College Athletes Bill of Rights, S. 5062, 116th Cong. § 5(a)(3) (2020). Since the vast majority of college
250
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In particular, Title IX mandates that if members of the football and
men’s basketball teams receive compensation, female student athletes would
also need to be compensated, thereby significantly increasing total expenses
for university athletics departments.254 This mandate importantly ensures
equitable spending across genders, often encouraging a transfer of revenue
from men’s sports to women’s sports.255 The NCAA earns over 80% of its
approximately $1 billion annual revenue from the men’s basketball March
Madness tournament, and roughly 90% of that is distributed to member
institutions to fund scholarships and other expenses.256 Historically, “football
has by far been the top-earning sport on American campuses, financing . . .
every other sport” and on average will produce more revenue than “the next
35 sports combined.”257 However, the cost of this mandate should not be used
to prevent the implementation now of a mechanism to address racial inequity
that has plagued the NCAA and falls disproportionately on Black male
athletes.258 Further, if the compensation is structured as a royalty based on a
certain percentage of revenue produced by each program instead of outright
predetermined compensation, this could not implicate Title IX; both
women’s and men’s programs would have the opportunity to receive
royalties in the event the programs produced revenue. These remaining
questions are important to resolve but should not stand in the way of ensuring
student athletes are finally compensated for their labor. The NCAA will need
to come up with an equitable solution without using these concerns as an
excuse to avoid fair compensation.
CONCLUSION
In a turbulent time for college sports, antitrust law could be the key to
student athletes successfully reforming a system that has exploited the labor
athletic programs are not profitable, this would only be applicable to a small subset of programs and
would not create additional financial expenses for most programs.
254 This does not require the same number of scholarships for men and women or individual
scholarships of equal value; rather, the statute requires that if 60% of a university’s athletes are men, only
60% of the total amount of financial aid should be awarded to male athletes. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
255 Title IX requires universities to provide financial assistance substantially proportional to the
participation rates of men and women in athletic programs. Id. Because the largest two revenue-producing
sports across the NCAA are men’s basketball and football, this results in a transfer of revenue to women’s
sports that do not produce revenue. See Mark J. Drozdowski, Do Colleges Make Money from Athletics?,
BEST COLLEGES (Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.bestcolleges.com/blog/do-college-sports-make-money/
[https://perma.cc/9DG5-9QAW].
256 See Drozdowski, supra note 255.
257 Id.
258 See HUMA ET AL., supra note 25, at 2 (“[T]he NCAA has built its enterprise on racial inequality
and injustice for decades.”). As discussed, preventing student athletes from profiting from their own labor
has transferred approximately $10 billion in generational wealth from football and men’s basketball
players to coaches and administrators. Id. at 3.
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of a disproportionately large number of Black student athletes for years and
left many of them with little or nothing to show for it. While Justice
Kavanaugh got the ball rolling by opening the door for student athletes to
continue challenging the NCAA compensation system through antitrust
litigation, federal legislation is likely to prove a more efficient avenue for
reform and allow more student athletes to receive compensation for their
labor sooner. The College Athletes Bill of Rights and College Athlete
Economic Freedom Act will lead to the broad reform student athletes have
been seeking that will afford them some of the rights NCAA executives have
enjoyed for decades. But the College Athlete Right to Organize Act provides
the greatest opportunity to accomplish a goal that began years ago:
classifying student athletes as employees so that they can engage in
collective bargaining and seek the specific rights and protections they want
most without needing to rely on the NCAA or universities to advocate on
their behalf. Enacting federal legislation that permits student athletes to be
compensated for their NIL rights and empowering student athletes through
collective bargaining can push this long-needed reform over the goal line and
allow student athletes to finally feel like they are not NCAA property.
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